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Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovations have played a major role since the industrial revolution and nowadays,
they play an even more important role. Innovations, in particular product innova-
tions are accompanied with changing industrial structures and hence, they affect
economic decisions. An important question then is how product innovations affect
decisions made by firms. For instance, how are capacities of products adjusted
if in the future a new substitute product is expected to be developed which will
enlarge the market but at the same time cannibalize existing demand? In other
words, how do firms react to an expected lower value of its installed capacity in the
future? Such questions have been addressed in multi-stage models where the num-
ber of products offered by firms depends on the stage of the game (cf. Dawid et al.
(2010b), Dawid et al. (2013a)). Unfortunately, in such models, neglecting the dy-
namic structure of industries might lead to wrong conclusions (cf. Cabral (2012)
and Dawid et al. (2010a)). Hence, in this thesis, time is modeled continuously
and optimal control and differential game models are used to analyze rigorously
dynamic variables such as capacities, quantities, prices, investments etc.
Typically, dynamic programming, i.e. the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
is employed in order to derive Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of differential games.
There, smoothness assumptions are made, in particular continuously differentiable
value functions are assumed in order to employ the HJB-equation and its smooth-
ness is verified ex-post. However, sufficiency conditions might not be fulfilled e.g.
if the value functions have kinks which might lead to multiple equilibria. In partic-
1
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ular, the decision maker might be indifferent between approaching different steady
states. Such indifference points are called Skiba or DNSS points, respectively, giv-
ing credit to the researchers Dechert, Nishimura, Skiba and Sethi who have started
studying such points in the 70’s. A standard example is the shallow lake model
which involves multiple equilibria with ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ steady states (see e.g.
Wagener (2003)). We encounter Skiba points as well leading either to staying with
an established product or to a new product’s introduction.
By the introduction of new products the market structure changes substan-
tially. In dynamic models, such a change is incorporated by considering different
modes, e.g. a mode with one product and another mode with two products. Tran-
sition between different modes has been considered in games as well. Such games
are called ‘piecewise deterministic’ or ‘multi-mode’ differential games in the lit-
erature (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)). There the transition between modes is
stochastic but all other components are deterministic. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this
thesis, there is no stochastic component but firms, to be more precise an innovator
can decide on the time when to switch to another mode, here by introducing a
new product. Hence, we focus on optimal timing of product introductions. In
Chapter 2, we find a situation where initial capacities have only an indirect effect
on the timing decision. More precisely, we find an optimal threshold for the firm’s
established capacity where the new product is introduced, hence timing is affected
indirectly by initial capacities since it just takes longer for the state to arrive at
the threshold if the state is further away or vice versa. However in Chapter 3, we
consider a different situation. There, optimal timing is affected directly by initial
conditions, and the switch to other modes might take place at different values
instead of at a certain threshold point or curve in a two-dimensional state space,
respectively.
While in Chapters 2 and 3, an implicit utility function of a representative
consumer leads to an inverse demand function which is stationary, demand is con-
sidered explicitly in a durable goods model in Chapter 4. In Chapters 2 and 3,
the inverse demand function is considered to be stationary even though examples
of products given there are also rather durable than non-durable. In Chapter 4,
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modeling demand explicitly by considering consumers with different valuations for
quality allows to analyze waiting effects. Here, again a similar setting is considered
where a monopolist introduces a new product, but here at an exogenously given
instant of time. Here, we focus on optimal pricing of the established and the new
product in the presence of rational consumers. Rational consumers might delay
their purchases. In general, there are two drivers of delay. First, in the standard
durable goods literature, waiting occurs due to consumers’ expectation of lower
prices in the future, for the same product. Second, consumers might delay their
purchase in order to buy the new product when it is introduced. We could have
assumed a flexible price for the established product and hence have considered
both drivers of delay but foregoing this option allows us to analyze the waiting
effect only due to innovation and makes the problem analytically more tractable.
However, not modeling the selling period of the established product dynamically
and assuming a static setting would not allow to characterize changing willingness
to pay of the consumers and its effect on pricing decisions. In other words, con-
sumers’ preferences are dynamic which adds pressure on firms price setting. What
makes this Chapter special is that the firm cannot commit to its future price and
hence the firm’s price setting is restricted to be credible. More precisely, consumers
restrict the firm’s action by forming a rational expectation for the future product’s
price which affects prices in a rational expectations equilibrium crucially.
Chapter 2
Delaying Product Introduction:
A Dynamic Analysis with
Endogenous Time Horizon
2.1 Introduction
For many firms, especially those operating in the high-tech sector, whenever a new
technology is available, they have to decide whether to adjust the product range
by incorporating the new technology and if yes, when to do so.
Wang and Hui (2012) provide examples of firms hesitating to incorporate new
available technologies and choosing to stay with the old technology for a while.
Examples include the technology of DVD that has been developed much earlier
than vendors started promoting DVDs. Another example is the MP3 standard.
In an empirical investigation, Chandy and Tellis (2000) have found that a large
fraction of product innovations has been achieved by incumbents. Indeed, we face
such a situation described above often in real-world markets and in many indus-
tries, submarkets evolve and coexist with the established product. An example is
the TV Industry where CRT televisions and flatscreens were sold simultaneously
for a long time (cf. Dawid et al. (2015)).
We consider an incumbent firm which has the option to introduce a horizontally
4
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and vertically differentiated substitute product which has a higher quality than the
established one. For realizing this option, it incurs one-time adoption costs. Thus,
the firm has to determine if the product introduction is profitable and if yes, when
the optimal time of product introduction is. After introduction, we assume that
the firm sells both products.
The firm faces the following trade-off: At the one hand, by launching the
new product it cannibalizes demand for the established product and at the other
hand, it benefits from the new product with higher quality by exploiting higher
willingness to pay of the consumers. We find that the cannibalization effect alone
cannot cause a delay. Delay is optimal if and only if there are adoption costs as
well e.g. coming from adjustment costs of the plant, advertisement activities or
fees paid to developers for using their technologies.
In particular, we find that if the firm is strong at the established market, i.e.
its capacities are at a high level, then the firm decides to wait and hence to intro-
duce the improved product later. By delaying, the firm benefits from discounting
adoption costs while it decreases the capacity of the established product before
the new product is introduced. This reduction of capacity increases the marginal
values of the capacities of the established and the new product at the time of
product introduction. Amongst others, this enables the incumbent to build-up ca-
pacities for the new product faster when it is introduced, compared to immediate
introduction.
There is a large literature on capital accumulating firms which has been ex-
tended by Dawid et al. (2015) who analyzed the optimal R&D effort for product
innovation and capital accumulation of established and new products, where the
breakthrough probability of developing a new product depends on both, a knowl-
edge stock and current R&D efforts via a hazard rate. Hence, in that paper
innovation time is stochastic and it is assumed that the new product is intro-
duced immediately once it is available. We focus on the optimal timing of product
introduction and optimal investment in capacities and differ from Dawid et al.
(2015) in not considering R&D efforts to develop a new product and not linking
successful development to market introduction but considering the time of market
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introduction as a choice variable. The classical literature on optimal timing of
technology adoption (see. e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1972) for a single firm and
Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for a duopoly) assumes that
quality increases due to technological progress and the only decision variable is the
time of technology adoption. Farzin et al. (1998) and Doraszelski (2004) extend
this stream of literature by considering the quality improvement as a stochastic
process. In contrast, in our model, the quality of the new product is fixed and
the firm cannot gain additional quality by delaying. Thus, our analysis focuses
on the dependence on initial characteristics whose importance has been addressed
a lot, e.g. in Hinloopen et al. (2013) where initial marginal costs determine if a
technology is developed further or not. Real options models (see e.g. Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)) have focussed on optimal timing in continuous time where de-
mand is stochastic e.g. evolving according to a Brownian motion. A simultaneous
analysis of optimal timing and optimal investment in capacities in the real op-
tions literature has been provided by Huisman and Kort (2015) where the price of
the good is stochastic. We differ from that stream of literature by considering a
deterministic environment and continuous adjustments of capacities.
The problem of an incumbent delaying product introduction has been addressed
in Wang and Hui (2012). They apply a discrete three-period time framework where
they do not take into account capacity adjustments. In contrast to Wang and Hui
(2012), in our model, delaying cannot be optimal if there are no adoption costs.
From a technical perspective, we employ Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for
free end time (see. e.g. Grass et al. (2008)) to obtain analytical results concerning
the optimal investments and the optimal time of market introduction.
Moreover, in this optimal control problem, due to the non-concave structure
of the value function, the Arrow-Mangasarian sufficiency conditions are not met
which for certain states lead to the presence of multiple optimal investment paths.
In particular, we characterize situations in which the firm is indifferent between
approaching different steady states (see Skiba (1978)). In such models, qualitative
properties of solutions depend very much on parameters (cf. Hinloopen et al.
(2013)). Therefore, we use a bifurcation analysis to assess industry dynamics
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for different values of adoption costs where we encounter a deformed pitchfork
bifurcation.
The analysis in this paper is carried out for a monopoly setting. Even though
the real-world examples we have raised stem from competitive environments, we
believe that it is important to consider the monopoly as it is interesting in its own
right. Indeed, timing of product introduction is not only influenced by competing
firms but from competing substitute products as well even if there is only a sin-
gle firm. As the established and new product are substitutes, there is ‘internal’
competition between those two products. In order to disentangle rivalry between
products and between firms, it is reasonable to analyze the monopoly case before
proceeding to the competition case.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sect. 2.2. Sect.
2.3 is devoted to the technical analysis. In Sect. 2.4, we provide an economic inter-
pretation, conduct a bifurcation analysis and present optimal timing curves. Sect.
2.5 analyzes welfare effects of delaying product introduction. Model assumptions
are discussed in Sect. 2.6 and Sect. 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
We consider an incumbent firm which has initial capacityKini1 to produce an estab-
lished product. A new substitute product with higher quality has been developed
and is ready for market introduction. Product introduction comes with lump-sum
adoption costs F . An important assumption is that the incumbent cannot invest
in capacities of the new product before introducing it, i.e. there are no capacities
at the time of introduction for the new product.
We follow the literature on optimal capital accumulation by relying on a stan-
dard linear model (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)). Thus, the firm faces a linear
inverse demand function which is given by
p1(t) = 1−K1(t). (2.1)
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After product introduction, the inverse linear demand system1 is given by
p1(t) = 1−K1(t)− ηK2(t), (2.2)
and
p2(t) = 1 + θ − ηK1(t)−K2(t), (2.3)
where η with 0 < η < 1 measures the degree of horizontal and θ > 0 the degree of
vertical differentiation of the substitutes.
The firm wants to determine the optimal time of product introduction T and
the optimal investment strategies before and after product introduction. There is
no inventory, i.e. capacities equal sales2. The capacity dynamics are
K˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δKi(t), i = 1, 2, (2.4)
K1(0) = Kini1 , K2(t) = Kini2 = 0 ∀ t ≤ T, (2.5)
where δ > 0 measures the depreciation rate. As has been done in Dawid et al.
(2015), we allow the firm to intentionally scrap capacities, i.e. Ii ∈ R while
capacities have to remain non-negative:
Ki(t) ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (2.6)
Adjusting capacities is costly, in particular it comes with quadratic costs
C
(
Ii(t)
)
= γ2 I
2
i (t), i = 1, 2. (2.7)
Normalizing production costs to zero, the objective function of the firm is given
by the following expression:
max
T,I1(t),I2(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t)− C(I1)
)
dt
+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t) + p2(t)K2(t)− C(I1)− C(I2)
)
dt− e−rTF.
(2.8)
We refer to this problem as P(Kini1 ).
1This demand system is motivated by the fact that the two products are substitutes and
competing with each other. According to the seminal result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
setting prices optimally subject to ex-ante capacity commitments reduces to a Cournot setting
which we adopt here.
2This assumption has been used in large parts of the literature on dynamic capacity invest-
ment, see e.g. Goyal and Netessine (2007). See Section 2.6 for a discussion of this assumption.
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2.3 Analysis
In case that the firm wants to introduce the improved product at some finite time
T , there will be a structural change of the model. Therefore, we denote by mode 1
(m1) the optimal control problem up to time T and by mode 2 (m2) the problem
after T . Denote by V m1(K1) and V m2(K1, K2) the corresponding value functions
of the infinite horizon control problems where the mode is fixed and hence does not
change3. The optimal control problem at hand where the mode m might change
is denoted by V (K1, K2, t,m) and we refer to this problem as the optimal control
problem with introduction option.
The subproblem in m2 is linear-quadratic with infinite time horizon which can
be solved easily, as has been done in Dawid et al. (2015). The optimal strategy and
the value function are stationary for this problem, i.e. V (K1, K2, t,m2)=V m2(K1, K2)−
F . There is a unique globally asymptotically stable steady state under the optimal
strategy and the value function is given by4
V m2(K1, K2) = a+ bK1 + cK21 + dK2 + eK22 + fK1K2. (2.9)
The typical shape of the value function of m2 is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Value function of m2 at T , i.e. for K2 = 0. Parameters: r = 0.04, δ =
0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
By regarding the value function of the subproblem as the salvage value of the
3We suppress the argument t wherever it is possible and does not cause confusion.
4Equations for coefficients are given in Dawid et al. (2015).
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optimal control problem with introduction option, we can rewrite (2.8) by
max
T,I1(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1(t)K1(t)− C(I1(t))
)
dt+ e−rTS
(
K1(T )
)
, (2.10)
where S
(
K1(T )
)
= V m2(K1(T ), 0)− F .5 This problem can be solved analytically
by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for variable terminal time. The Hamiltonian
is
H(K1, I1, λ, t) = (1−K1)K1 − γ2 I
2
1 + λ(I1 − δK1), (2.11)
where λ is the co-state variable and the optimal investment is given by
I1 =
λ
γ
. (2.12)
The co-state equation reads
λ˙ = (r + δ)λ− (1− 2K1), (2.13)
and the transversality condition is given by6
λ(T ) = SK1 = V m2K1 (K1, 0). (2.14)
For nonzero finite T ∗, let
(
K∗1(·), I∗1 (·)
)
be an optimal solution to (2.10) on the
optimal time interval [0, T ∗]. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for variable end
time implies an additional constraint for the terminal time, which is given by
H(K∗1(T ∗), I∗1 (T ∗), λ(T ∗), T ∗) = rS
(
K∗1(T ∗)
)
− ST
(
K∗1(T ∗)
)
. (2.15)
Note that the salvage value does not depend explicitly on T ∗ and hence,
ST
(
K∗1(T ∗)
)
= 0. (2.16)
So, equation (2.15) requires that at the optimal time T ∗, the instantaneous revenue
from staying in m1 plus the assessment of the change of the state variable on the
one hand (which is given by the current-value Hamiltonian, abbr. by H) and the
interest on the salvage value (abbr. by rS) on the other hand are equal. This is
5K2(T ) = 0 since there are no capacities for the new product at T , yet.
6The canonical system, isoclines, the steady state for staying inm1 and its stability properties
are given in Appendix 2.A.1.
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quite intuitive since otherwise it would be optimal to stay longer in m1 if H is
higher than rS or to have introduced earlier if rS is higher than H.
In Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.A.2, we state that there are two solutions for
equation (2.15). By that lemma and Proposition 2.1 below, we show that for
F = 0, both solutions coincide and H ≤ rS for all values of established capacity,
i.e. immediate introduction is optimal and hence T ∗ = 0. For F > 0, there are
two distinct points satisfying the terminal condition. In the corresponding interval,
where the boundaries are given by the two points satisfying (2.15), there is H ≥ rS
(cf. Figure 2.12 in Appendix 2.A.2), i.e. for initial capacities in the interval, it is
optimal to reduce capacities down to the lower bound and to introduce the new
product, we say to jump to m2. We denote the two solutions of (2.15) by K lb1
and Kub1 , respectively for lower and upper bound of the interval with K lb1 ≤ Kub1 .
As mentioned above, for F = 0, both solutions coincide7, i.e. K lb1 = Kub1 (see
Appendix 2.A.2), which we denote by KF=01 .
So, for higher capacities than Kub1 , the unique solution is to introduce the new
product immediately again. In particular at Kub1 , the firm is indifferent between
both options. However, higher capacities than Kub1 will not be analyzed further
as there the firm switches immediately to m2 which has been analyzed in Dawid
et al. (2015).
As the optimal introduction time depends on the size of capacity, we consider
it as a correspondence depending on Kini1 and denote it by T ∗(Kini1 )8. It is a
correspondence since there are situations with multiple optimal values as we will
discuss in the following. We start by characterizing finite solutions.
Proposition 2.1. If T ∗(K1) is finite for all K1, then for all K1 ≤ K lb1 , it is
optimal to innovate immediately. For all K lb1 < K1 ≤ Kub1 , it is optimal to reduce
capacities and to innovate when the capacity reaches K lb1 , i.e. T ∗(K1) > 0.
7Technically, in case of no adoption costs, H and rS are tangential at KF=01 :
∂
∂K1
H(KF=01 , I∗1 (T ∗), λ(T ∗), T ∗) =
∂
∂K1
rV m2(KF=01 , 0). (2.17)
8An alternative would have been to define a function which gives the remaining time in m1
not depending on the initial but current capacity (cf. Long et al. (2017)).
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Proof. See Appendix 2.A.3
Proposition 2.1 states that immediate introduction is optimal if capacity for
the established product is lower than a certain threshold (given byK lb1 ) whereas for
capacities above, it is optimal to wait and to decrease capacities on the established
market before product introduction. Note, that there are infinite solutions where it
is not optimal to innovate immediately even though Kini1 ≤ K lb1 as we will discuss
at the end of this section.
In the next lemma we focus on the dependence of K lb1 on F and find that K lb1
is decreasing in F , i.e. as adoption costs increase, it takes longer to arrive at K lb1
for a fixed starting point Kini1 > K lb1 .
Lemma 2.1. K lb1 is decreasing in F .9
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.4.
In Figure 2.2, we illustrate how the value function evolves as F increases. For
K lb1 < K1 < K
ub
1 , the value function of the problem with introduction option is
higher than the value function of m2. As F increases and discounting adoption
costs become more important, the difference of the value function with introduction
option and the scrap value function gets larger. Furthermore, as the products are
vertically differentiated, the value of the problem of m2 is higher than of m1 for
no adoption costs. Thus, the value of the problem with introduction option is
higher than the value of the infinite problem of m1. Obviously, for large enough
F , the value function of the problem with introduction option will hit the value
function of the infinite horizon problem of m1 and infinite solutions will occur,
i.e. product introduction will not be sufficiently attractive anymore. We show in
Appendix 2.A.5 in Lemma 2.3 that there exists a unique value of adoption costs F˜
where this happens for the first time (see Figure 2.3). Thus, F˜ is the lowest value
of adoption costs for which it exists some initial value of capacity where the firm
abstains from product introduction. This result leads to the following corollary.
9Moreover, Kub1 is increasing in F . Thus, for increasing F , the interval [Klb1 ,Kub1 ] expands
around KF=01 .
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(a) F = 0.5 (b) F = 1
(c) F = 1.2 (d) F = 1.27
Figure 2.2: Value functions for different values of F . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ =
0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
Corollary 2.1. For F < F˜ , T ∗(K1) is finite for all initial capacities and Propo-
sition 2.1 applies.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2.3 in Appendix 2.A.5.
To sum up the results so far, for F = 0, the firm wants to launch the new
product immediately. For increasing F , there arises an interval given by [K lb1 , Kub1 ]
wherein the higher Kini1 the longer it takes to arrive at K lb1 where the firm wants
to launch the new product, i.e. the stronger the firm on the established market,
the more the firm delays. Moreover, due to Lemma 2.1, the higher the adoption
costs, the lower is the switching capacity, i.e. the firm wants to reduce capacities
more in advance before switching to m2.
Denote by K˜1 the lowest value of initial capacity where an infinite solution
exists for P(K˜1):
K˜1 = min{K1 | T ∗(K1) =∞}. (2.18)
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Figure 2.3: Value function for F = F˜ = 1.27437. Parameters: r = 0.04, δ =
0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
Note that K˜1 exists for F ≥ F˜ . The following proposition and corollary charac-
terize the situation at F˜ .
Proposition 2.2. At F = F˜ ,
K˜1 = Kss,m11 10 (2.19)
and the free end-time problem P(K˜1) has a unique solution with T ∗ =∞.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.7.
Corollary 2.2. At F˜ , for K1 < K˜1,
T ∗(K1) <∞, (2.20)
and for K˜1 ≤ K1 < K¯1,
T ∗(K1) =∞. (2.21)
Proof. Due to the definition of K˜1, for K1 < K˜1 only finite solutions are optimal.
According to the proof of Proposition 2.2, for K˜1 ≤ K1 < Kub1 , only infinite
solutions are optimal.
10Kss,m11 is the unique steady state for staying infinitely in m1 given in Appendix 2.A.1.
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Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.2 state that at F˜ , Kss,m11 is a threshold sepa-
rating finite and infinite solutions. That is, for K1 ≥ Kss,m11 the firm prefers not
innovating and stays in m1, whereas for K < Kss,m11 the firm decreases11 capacities
to K lb1 and hence introduces the new product eventually.
For characterizing the evolution of K˜1, we denote by F¯ the value of adoption
costs for which
V m1(K lb) = V m2(K lb)− F (= S(K lb)) (2.22)
holds, i.e. where the firm is indifferent between introducing immediately and
delaying infinitely at K lb1 .
Proposition 2.3. K˜1 is decreasing in F and for all F˜ < F < F¯ , the free end-time
problem P(K˜1) has two different solutions with optimal terminal times 0 < T f <∞
and T∞ = ∞, i.e. K˜1 is a Skiba point where the firm is indifferent between
introducing the product after some delay and not at all.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.8.
A consequence of Proposition 2.3 is that as F increases, the range of capacities
where the firm stays with only one product enlarges as K˜1 decreases. Moreover,
there is a finite and infinite solution at K˜112. As before, the timing for capacities
lower than K˜1 is finite. So there exist three different ranges of capacities where
optimal time of product introduction is either 0, infinite or in-between. We refer
to [F˜ , F¯ ) as the intermediate range of F and for F ∈ [F˜ , F¯ ) we refer to (K lb1 , K˜1)
as the waiting region.
Denote by ¯¯F the value of adoption costs where thereafter finite solutions dis-
appear for the first time13, i.e.
T ∗(0) =∞ . (2.23)
Now, we show that at F¯ the waiting region vanishes and only immediate or infinite
solutions for T remain.
11In Appendix 2.A.6 in Lemma 2.4, we show that at F˜ , Klb1 ≤ Kss,m1 holds.
12There is no other value of capacity where both solutions are optimal.
13As K˜1 is decreasing in F , at ¯¯F , K1 = 0 is the only remaining value for capacity such that
the firm is indifferent between immediate and no product introduction.
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Corollary 2.3. For F¯ ≤ F < ¯¯F , there exists a K˜1 > 0 such that for all K1 < K˜1
the firm introduces the new product immediately whereas for all K1 > K˜1 the firm
never introduces the new product. At K˜1, the incumbent is indifferent, in particular
the free end-time problem P(K˜1) has two different solutions with 0 = T f < T∞ =
∞. Moreover, at F¯ , K˜1 = K lb1 .
Proof. By definition of F¯ , the firm is indifferent between immediate and infinite
product introduction. By Proposition 2.3, K˜1 is decreasing and hits K lb1 at F¯
where solutions with 0 < T <∞ vanish.
Thus, for all F , K˜1 is separating finite and infinite solutions for T . Note that
for F < F¯ , the value function of m2 and the value function of the problem with
introduction option paste smoothly at K lb1 , i.e.14
∂V (K lb1 , 0,m1)
∂K1
= ∂V
m2(K lb1 )
∂K1
. (2.24)
Furthermore, at F˜ , the value function of the problem with introduction option
and the value function of m1 paste smoothly at K˜1 (see Figure 2.3) whereas for
F > F˜ the value function has a kink at K˜1 (cf. Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Value function for high F . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η = 0.9, θ =
0.1, γ = 0.15, F = 1.3.
2.3.1 Summary of Results
In total, as long as F is intermediate (i.e. F˜ ≤ F < F¯ ), we can split the state
space in three parts:
14Note that the value function is time-invariant and hence the time argument can be omitted,
i.e. V (Klb1 ,Klb1 , t,m) = V (Klb1 ,Klb1 ,m).
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i) ‘Immediate introduction’: K1 ≤ K lb1 : Firm innovates immediately, T ∗ = 0.
ii) ‘Delayed product introduction’: K lb1 < K1 ≤ K˜1: Firm delays introduction
and introduces product later at 0 < T ∗ <∞.
iii) ‘No introduction’: K1 ≥ K˜1: Firm delays introduction infinitely, i.e. there
is no product introduction.
For increasing F the indifference point K˜1 shifts to the left and eventually the
waiting region vanishes where K˜1 and K lb1 coincide and only two possibilities re-
main: Either the firm innovates immediately (for low capacities) or never (for high
capacities). Hence, for F ≥ F¯ , the value function is given by the upper curve of
the value functions V m1 and V m2 (see Figure 2.4).
We call F low if 0 < F < F˜ , intermediate if F˜ ≤ F < F¯ , high if F¯ ≤ F ≤ ¯¯F
and very high if F > ¯¯F .
• If there are no adoption costs, only scenario i) is prevalent.
• For low adoption costs, scenarios i) and ii) are possible depending on the
initial capacity level.
• If F is intermediate, all three scenarios are possible.
• For high adoption costs, only scenarios i) and iii) are possible.
• For very high adoption costs, only scenario iii) is prevalent.
2.4 Dynamics
In Section 2.4.1, we give an economic interpretation of the optimal capacity in-
vestments and the timing decision. A bifurcation analysis is presented in Section
2.4.2. Optimal timing curves and its dependence on parameters of horizontal and
vertical differentiation are given in Section 2.4.3.
In order to derive dynamics, we consider the following default parameter set-
ting taken from Dawid et al. (2015):
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r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15. (2.25)
2.4.1 Economic Interpretation
The intuition for the ‘Immediate Introduction’ and ‘No Introduction’ scenario is
straight forward. The benefit from the new product is either so high that the firm
does not want to wait or the benefit is too low such that the firm stays with the
established product. Thus, we focus on the interpretation of the interesting case
of delay. Note that for finite T ∗, before T ∗, the Hamiltonian H is greater than the
interest on the salvage value rS and at T ∗, they are equal15. In a sense the firm
exploits profits in m1 before moving to m2. By choosing T ∗ > 0, the Hamiltonian
is affected16 via the co-state λ(t). In economic terms, the following mechanisms
can be identified.
First, the delay in time leads to stronger discounting of the scrap value V m2−F .
The firm saves adoption costs as F is paid as a lump-sum, but gets V m2 later as
well. The latter is smoothed by the concave structure of the value function ofm2 as
the firm reduces capacities of the established product and hence V m2 increases17.
Second, in the proof of Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.A.2, we find that
∂V m2
∂K2
(KF=01 , 0) = 0, (2.26)
which has an interesting economic intuition. In contrast to m1, in m2, the firm
is able to invest in K2. For F = 0 at KF=01 and elsewhere, there is no reason for
waiting. But for higher F > 0, waiting yields discounting of adoption costs while at
KF=01 , (2.26) still holds and thus there is no gain from immediate switching to m2
and investing inK2. Thus, by postponing the product introduction, the incumbent
can decrease the capacity of K1 before switching such that ∂V
m2
∂K2
(K lb1 , 0) > 0, i.e.
when switching, the marginal value of the new product’s capacity is higher and
15Note that this is not necessarily true for the infinite case since if T ∗ is infinite, the transver-
sality condition for the co-state variable and hence the Hamiltonian would be altered.
16Note that the investment in established capacity depends on the co-state as well.
17This holds as long as the switching capacity Klb1 is greater than the maximal argument of
V m2 which is true for the considered parameter setting.
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hence there is an immediate gain from investment in K2. Hence, the investment
pattern in m2 is affected, where due to the reduced capacity of the established
product, the firm has stronger incentives to build-up capacities for the new product
and the disinvestment in the established product is weaker18 than it would be
without delay. Hence, in m2, profits drop and are initially lower than in m1 as
there is a strong investment in capacities of the new product but sales increase
only gradually for the new product. By delaying, the firm can postpone this drop
in profits and enjoy ’high’ profits in m1. However, the drop in profits is stronger
compared to immediate introduction.
2.4.2 Bifurcation Analysis
We have a situation in mind where a new improved version of a product is launched
which is a close substitute to the established product. This is reflected by a rela-
tively high η and low θ. We do robustness checks with respect to those parameters
in Section 2.4.3. The other parameter choices are very standard.
From Figure 2.3, it is clear that the value function is not concave in K1 and
hence does not satisfy the Arrow-Mangasarian sufficiency conditions. Thus, as
mentioned earlier, in this section we examine the qualitative properties of the
steady states of the control problem with introduction option with respect to the
parameter F . We start by drawing a bifurcation diagram of m1 (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Bifurcation diagram of m1.
18This is due to the increased marginal value of the established capacity.
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The gray area is not present in m1 since if the firm starts in that area or arrives
there, it introduces the new product and hence is no more in m1 but in m2. As
we are interested in characterizing dynamics in m1 and in m2 together, we draw
a superimposed bifurcation diagram of both modes (cf. Hinloopen et al. (2017))
in Figure 2.6. For F < F˜ , we have a unique stable steady state. No matter if
Figure 2.6: Superimposed diagram.
the firm delays product introduction or not, it will eventually arrive at the steady
state level of K1 in m2 denoted by Kss,m21 . As analyzed before, at F˜ there arises a
second steady state where for initial capacities K˜1 ≤ K1 ≤ Kub1 (which are in the
red area in Figure 2.6) the firm stays in m1 and eventually arrives at Kss,m11 .
At ¯¯F the equilibrium point Kss,m21 vanishes and it remains only Kss,m11 for
F > ¯¯F (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Dynamics around ¯¯F .
Besides, we have a deformed pitchfork bifurcation which exhibits a hysteresis
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phenomenon where initially only one stable steady state exists and for higher F a
second equilibrium arises ’out of the blue sky’, where a repelling curve separates
the two basins of attraction (red and blue area) where for very high F only the
second equilibrium remains. The black dashed curve is the Skiba curve (which is
repelling except at the two steady states where it is semi-stable). Note that for
capacities on the Skiba curve in between the two steady states, optimal paths are
moving in opposite directions but for capacities on the Skiba curve below Kss,m21
both optimal paths move in same direction (see Figure 2.7). Note that this is a
superimposed diagram and not a bifurcation diagram in the classical sense and
the latter is possible since there the firm either jumps immediately to m2 or never,
which means that we actually consider two disjoint optimal control problems where
the mode can be interpreted as a further state variable.
2.4.3 Characterization of Optimal Timing Curves
As discussed in Section 2.3, for F ≥ F˜ , K˜1 separates finite and infinite solutions
for the optimal introduction time. Thus, it jumps at K˜1 to infinity. Hence, for
K˜1 ≤ K1 ≤ Kub1 , the value function of the problem with introduction option is
equal to the value function of the problem without introduction option.
We now investigate in detail what happens when F approaches F˜ . The graphs
of the optimal introduction time are depicted in Figure 2.8. For low adoption costs,
F = 1 F = 1.274 F = F˜ ≈ 1.27437
Figure 2.8: Optimal time of switching for increasing F .
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the correspondence is concave for K1 ≥ K lb1 . As analyzed in Section 2.3, it is finite
for low adoption costs whereas it becomes infinite at F˜ for K1 ≥ K˜1 = Kss,m11 .
For F approaching F˜ , T ∗(K1) becomes convex-concave and very steep at Kss,m11 ,
i.e Kss,m11 becomes an inflection point (see Figure 2.8) which means that the firm
decreases higher capacities and "stays around" Kss,m11 for a while until it starts
decreasing again down to K lb1 . Note that for F < F˜ , T ∗(K1) is finite everywhere,
whereas at F˜ , T ∗(K1) is infinite for K1 ≥ Kss,m11 .
K1lb K1˜
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
K1
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
I1
Figure 2.9: Capacity-investment dynamics for F = 1.275.
Figure 2.9 depicts optimal curves in the (K1, I1) space for the interesting case
of intermediate adoption costs where K˜1 separates the two basins of attraction.
For K lb1 < K1 < K˜1, the firm decreases capacities down to K lb and introduces the
new product. In m2, it continues decreasing capacities of K1 down to Kss,m21 while
it builds up capacities for the new product up to Kss,m22 .
Effect of Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation
For decreasing degree of horizontal differentiation η, the products become more
differentiated and thus the firm is expected to benefit from this. As both markets
get more independent we expect that the firm is willing to introduce the new
product earlier. Numerical experiments are in line with this intuition (see Figure
2.10). Analogously, for increasing θ we get similar results.
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Figure 2.10: Optimal time of switching for different parameterizations of η and θ.
2.5 Welfare Implications
For analyzing welfare implications, note that the inverse demand functions stem
from the following utility function of the consumers where M is the initial endow-
ment:
CS(t) = u(K1, K2) = K1+(1+θ)K2− 12(K
2
1 +K22)−ηK1K2+(M−p1K1−p2K2).
(2.27)
The welfare depends on the interpretation of adoption costs. If it is paid to the
developer of the technology, then it is considered as a transfer and it is always
profitable to introduce the new product immediately. But if it is considered as
‘real’ costs, then it has to be taken into account. In that case, the social planner
maximizes the difference of consumer surplus and costs of investment and adoption:
max
T,I1(t),I2(t)
J =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
u(K1, 0)− γ2 I
2
1
)
dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
u(K1, K2)− γ2 (I
2
1 + I22 )
)
dt−e−rTF.
(2.28)
We expect that product introduction is favorable from a social point of view as in
m2, there is a new product of higher quality which affects the consumer only posi-
tively. For the given parameter setting, we find that delaying product introduction
occurs only for very large F , in particular for F > 2.4492 19. So, as expected, from
19Note that for the profit maximizing firm delay occurs even for F = ,  > 0, which is
substantially lower than 2.4492.
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the perspective of a social planner, it is optimal to introduce immediately for a
wide range of F .
For the case of ’real’ costs, the welfare difference of the situation of a profit
maximizing firm and the situation where the firm is controlled by a social planner
is depicted in Figure 2.11 for Kini1 = K
ss,m1
1 . The welfare loss is initially constant
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11: Welfare gain for K1 = Kss,m11 . Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.1, η =
0.9, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.15.
as in both situations, immediate introduction is optimal (as long as Kss,m11 < K lb1 )
but at some critical F (where K lb1 < K
ss,m1
1 ), the firm starts delaying the product
introduction which increases the welfare loss. However, for F ≥ F˜ , the welfare
loss decreases (see Figure 2.11(b)) as the firm stays in m1 where F does not have
an effect whereas the welfare for the social planner decreases as costs of switching
to m2 increase.
2.6 Discussion of Results and Assumptions
Somewhat surprising is that the first appearance of solutions where the firm stays
with the established product is accompanied by a threshold point separating finite
and infinite solutions for the terminal time. One might think that the rationale
behind is thatm1 andm2 are endogenously linked as inm2 the number of products
increases. But the phase-plane analysis (given in Appendix 2.A.7) shows that this
situation might occur even for a switch to an exogenously given mode, in particular
whenever the terminal pair is on the unstable manifold.
Chapter 2. A Dynamic Analysis with Endogenous Time Horizon 25
From an economic perspective, delay was expected in order to discount adop-
tion costs and increase the scrap value at the time of introduction. Our analy-
sis shows that the decrease of established capacities is accompanied by a larger
marginal value for the new product in m2, i.e. investing in the capacities of the
new product is stronger than it would be with immediate introduction.
In our analysis, we abstract from competition. However, a monopoly could
turn into a competing environment if entry is possible. Thus, if there is a threat
of possible entrants, we expect that this would accelerate product introductions.
Another issue is that we do not consider the phase of development of the
new product. For the interpretation that the new product is developed by the
incumbent himself, it is clear that the firm is not going to engage in R&D activities
if the product is not introduced eventually. In the case where the product is
introduced with some delay, we expect that R&D efforts would be less in the
development phase which would have a similar impact on the introduction time.
For the interpretation of external developers generating a new technology where
adoption costs mainly consist of buying the patent for the new technology, an
alternative option to adoption costs which has to be paid once when the product
is introduced, would be to consider fees per unit which has to be paid to the
owner of the patent. There, as long as the fee per unit is constant and less than θ,
introduction would occur immediately since fees are paid continuously, so adoption
costs are ‘spread over time’.
We made the assumption that capacities are fully used, i.e. production equals
sales. We believe that this assumption is of minor consequence to our results since
in our model, there are no capacities for the new product in T and investment in
capacities has quadratic costs such that capacities are not build up as a ‘lump-
sum’ but slowly while the capacity of the established product is reduced slowly.
Moreover, in the case of delay, the incumbent starts reducing capacities even in
m1. A rigorous analysis of the full usage of capacity assumption yields that it is
optimal to exploit full capacity if the following conditions hold:
2K1 + ηK2 ≤ 1, (2.29)
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ηK1 + 2K2 ≤ 1 + θ. (2.30)
Numerical experiments suggest that conditions (2.29) and (2.30) seem to be satis-
fied for reasonable values of K1 (≤ Kss,m11 )20.
Furthermore, e.g. for decreasing demand, it is argued that in practice firms
reduce prices in order to maintain production rather than reducing production
due to contracts with employees and suppliers, even though such contracts are
not modeled here (cf. Goyal and Netessine (2007)). However, counterexamples
exist as well where firms have excess capacity e.g. for deterring entry (see Chicu
(2012)).
This analysis focuses on the effect of adoption costs. However, for some prod-
ucts, not adoption costs but differences in production costs may be the main reason
for firms to abstain from product introduction, in particular if the old and new
product’s production costs differ a lot. Apple had developed a mouse in 1979
whose production costs were too much such that Apple abstained from further
development of this mouse and hence from introducing it (cf. Hinloopen et al.
(2013)).
20In the case of no horizontal and vertical differentiation, i.e. η = 1 and θ = 0, conditions
(2.29) and (2.30) are satisfied if
K1 ≥ 13 ∧K2 ≤
1
3 , (2.31)
or
K1 ≤ 13 ∧K2 ≥
1
3 . (2.32)
For our default parameter setting with F = 1.275, (2.31) and (2.32) are satisfied. In the case of
horizontal and vertical differentiation, (2.29) and (2.30) are weakened. For higher θ, the incum-
bent wants to build up capacities for the new product faster, but also to decrease capacities of
the established product faster. For lower η, as products are more differentiated and competition
of the established and the new product is weakened, investment in the new product’s and disin-
vestment of the established product’s capacities are slower. Thus, in both cases, we expect that
(2.29) and (2.30) are not affected much.
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2.7 Conclusion
Using a fully dynamic framework we identify different scenarios where the firm’s
behavior depends crucially on the capacity of the established product and on the
level of adoption costs. There is an interesting case where it is not optimal for the
firm to introduce the new product immediately but to delay product introduction.
By delay in time, adoption costs are discounted while the firm prepares for prod-
uct introduction by reducing capacities on the established market which increases
the marginal value of the established and new products’ capacities. Moreover, the
incumbent postpones investment in new capacity and hence benefits longer from
high profits before product introduction. Noteworthy is the occurrence of Skiba
points where the firm is indifferent in approaching different steady states which
affects the number of products produced by the firm. We assumed that firms can-
not invest in capacities beforehand. Allowing for investment before introduction
might have an effect on the time of introduction, in particular we expect that this
would accelerate product introduction while we think that qualitative results will
be the same. Furthermore, we abstained from competition which is analyzed in
Chapter 3.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1
The canonical system is given by
K˙1 =
λ
γ
− δK1,
λ˙ = (r + δ)λ− (1− 2K1),
(2.33)
and the isoclines are
K˙1 = 0 ⇔ λ = δγK1,
λ˙ = 0 ⇔ λ = 1− 2K1
r + δ .
(2.34)
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If the firm does not introduce the new product, i.e. for staying in m1 infinitely,
there is a unique steady state
Kss,m11 =
1
δγ(r + δ) + 2 , λ
ss,m1 = δγ
δγ(r + δ) + 2 . (2.35)
The steady state is a saddle point as the Jacobian is
−δ 1γ
2 r + δ
 (2.36)
with
det J = −δ(r + δ)− 2
γ
< 0. (2.37)
The eigenvalues are given by
µ1,2 =
r
2 ±
√(
r
2
)2
+ δ(r + δ), (2.38)
so eigenvalues have different sign and the steady state is indeed a saddle point.
2.A.2
Lemma 2.2. Condition (2.15) holds for(
K∗1
)
1,2
= −d
f
±
√
2γrF
f 2
. (2.39)
Proof.
Consider the terminal condition21 (2.15):
H(K∗1 , I∗1 , λ(T ∗), T ∗) = rS
(
K∗1
)
(2.40)
⇔
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2 I
∗
1
2 + λ(T ∗)(I∗1 − δK∗1) = r(V m2(K∗1)− F ) (2.41)
⇔
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2 I
∗
1
2 + ∂V
m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) = r(V m2(K∗1)− F ). (2.42)
21For convenience, we henceforth omit the dependence of state and control variables on T ∗.
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The HJB-equation in m2 at T ∗ is given by22
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2 (I
∗
1
2 + I∗2
2) + ∂V
m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) +
∂V m2
∂K2
I∗2 = rV m2(K∗1). (2.43)
For I∗2 =
V
m2
K2
γ
, we have:
(1−K∗1)K∗1 −
γ
2 I
∗
1
2 + ∂V
m2
∂K1
(I∗1 − δK∗1) +
1
2γ
(
∂V m2
∂K2
)2
= rV m2(K∗1). (2.44)
Using (2.44) and (2.42) yields
rF = 12γ
(
∂V m2
∂K2
)2
, (2.45)
which under consideration of K2 = 0 yields the two solutions
K lb1 := −
d
f
−
√
2γrF
f 2
, (2.46)
and
Kub1 := −
d
f
+
√
2γrF
f 2
. (2.47)
2.A.3
Proof of Proposition 2.1. By Lemma 2.2 in Appendix 2.A.2, we know that for
F = 0 the terminal condition of the Maximum Principle holds for KF=01 and
H < rS for other values of capacity23. For F > 0, F occurs negatively on the
right hand side of the terminal condition and only there. Thus, there arises an
interval whose bounds are given by (2.46) and (2.47) wherein H > rS (see Figure
2.12). For Kini1 outside the interval, the opposite holds. Hence, for Kini1 ≤ K lb1 , the
interest on the salvage value is higher than the current value Hamiltonian. Thus,
immediate introduction is optimal.
22Note that F is paid for switching to m2 and does not occur in m2 anymore.
23Cf. Appendix 2.A.2. For F = 0, the square root in (2.39) vanishes and both solutions
coincide. Moreover, note that for F = 0, the only extra term in (2.44) in comparison to (2.42) is
1
2γ
(
∂Vm2
∂K2
)2
which is non-negative. Hence for all K1, H is less or equal than rS (it is equal for
Klb1 (= Kub1 ) as 12γ
(
∂Vm2
∂K2
)2
= 0).
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(a) F = 0 (b) F = 1.2
Figure 2.12: Left hand side (H) and right hand side (rS) of terminal condition.
For K lb1 < K1 ≤ Kub1 the optimal switching capacity K lb1 has to be reached by
the transversality condition. Thus the firm reduces capacities down to K lb1 and
innovates.
2.A.4
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Taking the derivative of K lb1 with respect to F yields
∂K lb1
∂F
= − 2γr
2f 2
√
2γrF
f2
= −
√
γr
2Ff 2 < 0 . (2.48)
2.A.5
Lemma 2.3. ∃! F˜ > 0 such that ∀F ≥ F˜ , ∃ K1 with T ∗(K1) =∞, i.e. V (K1) =
V m1(K1) and ∀F < F˜ , @ K1 with T ∗(K1) =∞.
Proof. The value function of m1 without the option to switch to m2 is independent
of F whereas the value function of the control problem with introduction option is
decreasing in F due to the decreasing salvage value. Thus, there is some F˜ where
the value function of the control problem with introduction option hits the value
function of m1 for the first time which is greater than 0 since for F = 0, switching
is costless and in m2, there is the option of producing the new product which has
a higher quality (θ > 0)24.
24Even for no vertical differentiation, introducing the new product is beneficial as the market
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2.A.6
Lemma 2.4. At F = F˜ ,
K lb1 ≤ K˜1 (2.49)
holds.
Proof. Let F = F˜ . Assume K˜1 < K lb1 . Then, for K˜1, H < rS, which yields that
the unique solution is to switch to m2 which contradicts F = F˜ .
2.A.7
We first state the following lemma which is necessary for the proof of Proposition
2.2.
Lemma 2.5. The dynamics at the terminal pair
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
are not K˙1 > 0 and
λ˙ > 0 simultaneously.
Proof. The terminal pair is determined by H = rS and λ(T ) = SK1 . The line
λ(T ) = SK1 = b + cK1 has a positive ordinate (b > 0) as K1’s marginal value is
positive if there are no capacities installed. One might think that this line could
pass through the area to the right-upper of the intersection point of K˙1 = 0 and
λ˙ = 0 where K˙1 > 0 and λ˙ > 0 hold. This would yield different dynamics than
studied so far. However, one can easily show that for terminal pairs in that area,
there is no candidate for an optimal solution with 0 < T ∗ < ∞. In particular,
for Kini1 > K lb1 , there are either no candidate paths or only non-monotone paths
arriving at the terminal pair which cannot be optimal25. Converging to the steady
state of m1 along the stable manifold is not optimal as well as time consistency
is violated since for K1 < K lb1 , H < rS holds. Thus, there are no optimal paths
for Kini1 > K lb1 which yields a contradiction and proves that this situation cannot
is expanded and the firm is able to split the total quantity among the two products which yields
a higher price (cf. Dawid et al. (2015)).
25Non-monotone paths imply a set of Skiba points which generates fluctuating paths for
T ∗ =∞, which contradicts to the uniqueness property of the steady state of the infinite horizon
problem.
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Figure 2.13: Vector plot for F = 1.275 (> F˜ ).
occur. Moreover, the slope of the λ(T ) line is necessarily negative (c < 0), i.e. the
marginal value of K1 is decreasing as ∂
2Vm2
∂K21
= c.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. As the steady state of m1 is a saddle-point, there is a
stable and unstable manifold. If T ∗ is finite but not zero, then the switching pair(
K1(T ), λ(T )
)
in the (K1, λ) space is derived from the condition H = rS and the
transversality condition λ(T ) = SK1 . As F increases and K lb1 decreases, there is
an F , where
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
is on the unstable manifold with K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 026.
Denote that F by F uns. For arriving at that pair, the initial pair has to be on
the unstable manifold. Thus, for all K1 ≥ Kss,m11 , there is no optimal path which
leads to (K lb1 , λ(T )), i.e. for all K1 ≥ Kss,m11 , T ∗(K1) =∞.
Next, we prove that F˜ = F uns. Obviously, F˜ ≤ F uns 27. Assume F˜ < F uns.
Then, by Lemma 2.1, at F˜ , the terminal pair is right to the unstable manifold.
Denote for all possible terminal values K1(T ) the value of the path which leads
26As shown in Lemma 2.5, the dynamics at the terminal pair are not K˙1 > 0 and λ˙ > 0
simultaneously. Hence, the line passes through the area where K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 0 holds as it has
a positive ordinate and negative slope.
27Note that for Funs infinite solutions for T exist. As F˜ is the minimal value of adoption costs
for which infinite solutions exist, F˜ ≤ Funs holds.
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to the terminal pair by V term(K1(t), K1(T ), F ) which in this case exists for all
K1 ≥ K1(T ) and for all F < F uns and is continuous in F .
In order to avoid confusion, for an F , we denote the corresponding K lb1 by
K lb1 (F ). For Kini1 > K˜1,
V term(Kini1 , K lb1 (F˜ ), F˜ ) < V m1(Kini1 ), (2.50)
holds28. Hence, ∃ F l < F˜ with
V term(Kini1 , K lb1 (F l), F l) = V m1(Kini1 ), (2.51)
which contradicts the minimality of F˜ . Hence, the assumption F˜ < F uns was
wrong and F˜ = F uns holds.
Now, we prove that K˜1 is not less than Kss,m11 again by contradiction. Assume
that K˜1 < Kss,m11 . Then, consider Kint1 for which K˜1 < Kint1 < K
ss,m1
1 holds. For
F = F˜ , we have29
V term(Kint1 , K lb1 (F˜ ), F˜ ) < V m1(Kint1 ). (2.52)
Again, by continuity of V term in F , there exists an F l < F˜ with
V term(Kint1 , K lb1 (F l), F l) = V m1(Kint1 ), (2.53)
which contradicts the minimality of F˜ . Thus, K˜1 = Kss,m11 and it is a threshold
point30 where the firm is not indifferent.
28It can not be V term(Kini1 ,Klb1 (F ), F ) = V m1(Kini1 ) since forKini1 ≥ K˜1, trajectories of the fi-
nite and infinite solution move in the same direction (as due to Lemma 2.4,Klb1 ≤ K˜1) and accord-
ing to Proposition 1 in Caulkins et al. (2015), in that case, the trajectories have to coincide for all
t ∈ [0, T ∗(Kini1 )] which is apparently not true. Moreover, V term(Kini1 ,Klb1 (F ), F ) > V m1(Kini1 )
cannot hold either since this leads to another solution for the problem without introduction op-
tion via moving to K˜1 along the path corresponding to the finite solution of T and switching at
K˜1 to the solution of the problem without introduction option.
29Note that in this case, V term exists for K1 < K˜1. Moreover, as this problem is time invariant
and trajectories of the finite and infinite solution move in opposite directions and due to the
monotonicity of the trajectory of the infinite solution
(
see Hartl (1987)
)
, the trajectory of the
finite solution is monotone as well and there can not be an overlap region, i.e. there is no interval
of Skiba points (cf. Caulkins et al. (2015)). Thus, at F˜ forKint1 , the infinite solution is the unique
optimal solution.
30Here, a threshold point is characterized by having finite and infinite solutions for T in every
neighborhood (cf. Caulkins et al. (2015)).
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2.A.8
Proof of Proposition 2.3. As K lb1 decreases with F , for F˜ < F < F¯ , the terminal
pair
(
K1(T ), λ(T )
)
=
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
is left to the unstable manifold (cf. proof of
Proposition 2.2 in 2.A.7). There, the dynamics are given by K˙1 < 0 and λ˙ < 0.
Starting at the terminal pair
(
K lb1 , λ(T )
)
and moving backwards along the arc
leading to it, i.e. considering V term introduced in 2.A.7 (cf. Figure 2.13), we can
identify candidates for the optimal starting point for different Kini1 ’s. This arc hits
the K˙1 = 0 line at some Kh1 . This is the highest K1 for which a finite candidate T
exists since following the arc further gives further candidates for K lb1 ≤ K1 < Kh1
as there is K˙1 > 0, which implies non-monotone paths for K1 which can not be
optimal (cf. Appendix 2.A.7). Hence, V term is well defined. For any K1 < Kss,m11 ,
it is also possible to converge to the steady state ofm1 by following the stable arc of
the steady state. Comparing values of both candidates by taking the upper curve
of the value functions corresponding to both options we obtain the value function
and the optimal strategies of the control problem with introduction option. Hence,
there is an indifference point 0 < K˜1 ≤ Kh1 where the firm is indifferent moving
to the steady state along the stable manifold and moving to K lb1 . Thus, K˜1 is
a Skiba point. As F increases, K lb1 and Kh1 decreases. Next, we prove that K˜1
decreases as well by contradiction. For F a, F b ∈ (F˜ , F¯ ), with F a < F b, denote the
corresponding indifference points by K˜1
a and K˜1
b and assume that K˜1
a ≤ K˜1b, i.e.
K˜1 is nondecreasing in F . Then,
V m1(K˜1
b) = V term(K˜1
b
, K lb1 (F b), F b) < V term(K˜1
b
, K lb1 (F a), F a) ≤ V m1(K˜1b)
(2.54)
which yields a contradiction31 . Hence, K˜1 is decreasing in F .
31The last inequality is due to the following: K˜1
a ≤ K˜1b and for K1 ≥ K˜1a, infinite solutions
are optimal.
Chapter 3
Delaying Product Introduction in
a Duopoly: A Strategic Dynamic
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Technological change is a crucial driver of industrial dynamics. Improved versions
of products appear regularly. Furthermore, product innovations lead to differenti-
ated products and new submarkets arise. According to an empirical investigation
by Chandy and Tellis (2000), most of the product innovations has been achieved
by established incumbents. Typical examples include Asus which has been active
on the notebook market and has introduced netbooks in 2007 or Apple’s introduc-
tion of the iPad in 2010 which generated a huge submarket for tablet computers.
For a firm competing with others on a homogeneous market, a product innovation
can be very valuable. Given that a product innovation has been made, we examine
whether there are incentives for an innovator not to introduce a new product im-
mediately but to delay the product introduction strategically or not to introduce
at all1. Wang and Hui (2012) provide examples where the market introduction
of products has been delayed, e.g. DVD players and MP3-related products which
1Several studies (Mansfield (1977), Åstebro (2003) and Åstebro and Simons (2003)) have
found out that a large fraction of product innovations is not brought to the market.
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could have been introduced earlier.
Given that two firms are competing on an established homogeneous market, we
assume that one of the firms has the option to introduce a new product whereas
his rival sticks with producing the established product. Moreover, we assume that
the new product is horizontally and vertically differentiated, in particular that
it has a higher quality than the established product. Both firms are restricted
by production capacities which they adjust over time. The setting after product
introduction has been analyzed in Dawid et al. (2010a). They find that not only
the innovator benefits but the non-innovator is better off as well in most cases,
in particular if the products are not too differentiated. The innovator strongly
reduces capacities on the established market in order to increase demand for the
established product.
Adjustments of capacities of established products prior to a product innova-
tion has been studied in a stochastic setting in Dawid et al. (2017) who consider a
duopoly where both firms can also invest in R&D in order to increase the probabil-
ity of product innovation (see Dawid et al. (2013b) for an exogenous hazard rate).
In contrast to those approaches, we assume that the innovation has been made
already and the time of product introduction is an additional choice variable and
hence is not directly linked to the time of the successful completion of an R&D
project. The separation of innovation and introduction has been employed by
Dawid et al. (2009), however only in a three-stage model where continuous capac-
ity adjustments are not taken into account and the timing of product introduction
could not be addressed.
The game we are considering is a multi-mode differential game where one of
the firms can induce a regime switch (in our context adding a second differentiated
product to its product range) at any time in contrast to models where a regime
switch occurs when the state variable hits some critical threshold (see e.g. Reddy
et al. (2015) and Masoudi and Zaccour (2013)).
Optimal timing of innovation has been analyzed extensively in the optimal stop-
ping and real options literature (see e.g. Dutta et al. (1995), Hoppe and Lehmann-
Grube (2005) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Recent contributions consider for
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stochastic demand, both, optimal timing and capacity choice simultaneously (see
e.g. Huberts et al. (2015) and Huisman and Kort (2015)). The latter finds in
a setting with two firms who have the option to enter a new market that firms
invest earlier compared to the monopoly setting. In particular, the first investor
overinvests in order to delay market entry of the second investor. The innovation
of the present paper relative to this literature is that it considers the dynamic
adjustment of capacities before and after the innovation, whereas mostly one-time
investments have been treated in the real options literature.
The monopoly version of this paper has been analyzed in Chapter 2 where a
deterministic setting is considered where a monopolist has the option to introduce
a substitute product. Even in a monopoly, where competition effects are excluded,
the firm might delay product introduction if it incurs adoption costs. By delaying
the product introduction, the monopolist benefits from discounted adoption costs,
which has to be paid as a lump sum at the time of product introduction. Fur-
thermore, the monopolist can increase the marginal value of the new product by
decreasing established capacities. Similar effects are also present in the duopoly
here, however strategic interaction adds substantial new effects.
Optimal timing has not been considered a lot in differential game models.
Yeung (2000) derives feedback Nash equilibria for games with endogenous time
horizon by restricting terminal values for state variables. Recently, Gromov and
Gromova (2017) formalize the class of hybrid differential games and characterize
a switching manifold in the time-state space which is determined by a switching
condition. They argue that deriving feedback Nash equilibria for state-dependent
switching is complicated and resort to open-loop Nash equilibria, which in certain
games, parametrized by initial conditions yields feedback Nash equilibria.
In terms of timing, the most related contribution is Long et al. (2017) where in
a differential game model with multiple regimes, the concept of piecewise-closed
loop Nash equilibria (PCNE) is introduced. They derive necessary conditions for
the optimal switching time in a two player setting, where both players can induce
a change of the regime of the game. The timing decision is given implicitly by the
state variable arriving at a certain state which is derived by optimality conditions.
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However, in their setting, it is assumed that firms commit to their switching time
in the sense, that they would not alter that time even if the other firm would
deviate from its equilibrium control path. Hence, the considered equilibrium is
not fully Markov perfect with respect to the timing decision.
In our approach, we consider a case where the innovator can fully commit to
its product introduction time. Hence, the competitor cannot influence the timing
of the product introduction. An equilibrium is given if the choice of the product
introduction time, T , maximizes the value of the game for the innovator while
given this T , the investment strategies played by both players constitute a Markov-
perfect Nash equilibrium in the classical sense. Note that the timing decision is
made in the beginning of the game for given initial capacities and hence it is an
open-loop strategy whereas the continuous control variables constitute a Markov
perfect equilibrium using closed-loop strategies. Characterizing a fully closed-loop
equilibrium in which the introduction of the new product is triggered if the state
variable hits a switching manifold (to be optimally determined by the innovator)
is technically challenging and might lead to non-existence of equilibria (see Long
et al. (2017) for details).
From an economic perspective, the commitment to the product introduction
time might be due to a preannouncement. There is a huge literature on prean-
nouncements considering its effects on various interest groups such as consumers,
competitors and others. Preannouncements are made for various purposes (cf.
Lilly and Walters (1997)). They are used e.g. for building interest for the new
product before the market launch (Bao et al. (2005)), in order to stimulate con-
sumers to delay purchases, in particular to wait for a better product (Su and Rao
(2010) or to deter entry of potential entrants or to induce a competitor to adjust
capacities or to reposition (see Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Heil and Robertson
(1991)).
We use dynamic programming for solving for the optimal capacity investment
strategies and derive an optimality condition for the optimal timing which depends
on the time-derivative of the corresponding value function at the outset of the
game. This game might be interpreted as a two stage game where in the first
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stage only the innovator decides on the introduction time and in the second stage
both firms play simultaneously either starting with only the established product
or with both products in case that the innovator introduces immediately.
We find that whenever it is optimal to delay the product introduction, the
optimal introduction time is increasing in adoption costs. Furthermore, we find
that the optimal introduction time increases in both initial capacities, i.e. the
stronger the innovator or the non-innovator on the established market, the later
the product introduction. The latter is in accordance with results of Dawid et al.
(2017) where R&D investments are negatively affected by both firms’ capacities.
Additionally, we find that in a duopoly, the innovator introduces the product
less often compared to a monopoly scenario. In case of product introduction, he
introduces earlier compared to the monopoly. Thus, this paper contributes to the
debate initiated by Schumpeter and Arrow where we see a connection between
both views where market concentration facilitates innovation but slows down its
arrival.
In section 3.2, we provide the model and in section 3.3, we derive a general
sufficient condition for delaying the product introduction. Furthermore, we derive
general necessary conditions for optimal timing which has to hold at the outset
of the game. A particular parameter setting is discussed in Section 3.4. Welfare
implications are characterized in Section 3.5. A discussion is given in Section 3.6.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider a duopoly where both firms, denoted by firm A and B, produce a
homogeneous established product, denoted as product 1. Due to product innova-
tion, firm A has the option to introduce a horizontally and vertically differentiated
substitute product with higher quality, denoted as product 2. We call this firm the
innovator whereas the other firm, firm B is called the non-innovator. The innova-
tor incurs a lumpy cost F at the time of introduction. For simplicity, we assume
that the innovator can only start to invest in the capacity of the new product after
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introduction, i.e. there are no capacities at the time of introduction for the new
product, yet.
Before product introduction, i.e. for all t ≤ T , the linear inverse demand
function for the established product is given by
pm11 (K1A(t), K1B(t)) = 1−K1A(t)−K1B(t), (3.1)
whereas after product introduction, i.e. for all t ≥ T , the inverse demand system
is given by
pm21 (K1A(t), K1B(t), K2A(t)) = 1−
(
K1A(t) +K1B(t)
)
− ηK2A(t), (3.2)
and
pm22 (K1A(t), K1B(t), K2A(t)) = 1 + θ −K2A(t)− η
(
K1A(t) +K1B(t)
)
, (3.3)
where η with 0 < η < 1 measures the degree of horizontal and θ > 0, the degree
of vertical differentiation of the strategic substitutes.
The innovator wants to determine the optimal time of product introduction T
and the optimal strategies for investment in capacities before and after product
introduction whereas the non-innovator only determines the optimal investment
strategies in its capacity of the established product. For simplicity, it is assumed
that capacities are always fully used (see Section 2.6 for a discussion of this assump-
tion). Adjustment of capacities is costly but production costs for given capacities
are normalized to zero. There is no inventory, i.e. production equals sales.
In total, there are 2 modes in this capital accumulation game:
• mode 1 (m1): New product is developed by the innovator and is ready for
market introduction which is common knowledge. Only the established prod-
uct is sold.
• mode 2 (m2): New product is introduced to the market. Both products are
sold.
Investment in capacities is costly, in particular comes with quadratic costs
C1(I1f (t)) =
γ1
2 I
2
1f (t), f = A,B, (3.4)
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and
C2(I2A(t)) =
γ2
2 I
2
2A(t). (3.5)
The capacity dynamics in m1 are
K˙1f = I1f − δK1f , f = A,B, (3.6)
for initial capacities
K1f (0) = Kini1f , f = A,B, (3.7)
where δ > 0 measures the depreciation rate of the capacities. In m2, there is an
additional state for the capacity of the new product which evolves in the same way
according to
K˙2A = I2A − δK2A, (3.8)
K2A(t) = 0 ∀t ≤ T. (3.9)
As in Dawid et al. (2010a), we allow the firms to intentionally scrap capacities (i.e.
investments might be negative) while capacities have to remain non-negative, i.e.
K1f ≥ 0 ∀ t, f = A,B, and K2A ≥ 0 ∀ t.
The discounted stream of profits of the innovator is given by
JA =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
pm11 (·)K1A − C1(I1A)
)
dt
+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
pm21 (·)K1A + p2K2A − C1(I1A)− C2(I2A)
)
dt− e−rTF,
(3.10)
which is maximized with respect to T , I1A and I2A. For the non-innovator, it is
given by
JB =
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
pm11 (·)K1B − C1(I1B)
)
dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt
(
pm21 (·)K1B − C1(I1B)
)
dt,
(3.11)
where the control variable of firm B is I1B.
3.3 Optimality Conditions
In this section, we will derive some sufficient and necessary conditions for the
optimal timing of the product introduction. It should be noted that those condi-
tions hold generally for models where two firms’ controls affect the dynamics of
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a continuously evolving state variable and one of the firms can induce a regime
switch.
For the sake of brevity, denote the capacity pair (K1A, K1B) by K. Let
φ1,f (K,K2A, t,m), f = A,B
be the Markovian investment strategies2 of both firms in mode m and T = τ(K)
the timing strategy of the innovator. Then, a strategy vector of the innovator
is a pair ψA = (φ1A, τ) whereas the strategy of the non-innovator is given by
ψB = φB. A strategy profile (ψA, ψB) is called an equilibrium if given τ , (φ1A, φ1B)
constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium and τ maximizes the objective functional
of the innovator.
In the case that the innovator introduces the improved product at some finite
time T , there will be a structural change of the model. Denote by V optf (K1A, K1B, K2A, t,m)
the value function of firm f in mode m where the switching time from m1 to m2 is
selected optimally by the innovator. Furthermore, denote by V m1f (K1A, K1B) and
V m2f (K1A, K1B, K2A), f = A,B, the value functions of the corresponding infinite
horizon games where the mode is fixed and hence does not change. This immedi-
ately gives V optf (K1A(t), K1B(t), K2A(t), t,m2) = V m2f (K1A(t), K1B(t), K2A(t))−F ,
f = A,B since in m2, the mode does not change anymore. Since the infinite hori-
zon games are time-autonomous, we consider stationary strategies and hence the
value functions of those infinite horizon games do not depend on time, explicitly.
The subproblem of m2 is of linear-quadratic type which can be solved easily by
the dynamic programming approach. Due to the linear quadratic structure of the
game, the value functions have the following form
V m2f =Cm2f +Dm2f K1A + Em2f K21A + Fm2f K1B +Gm2f K21B +Hm2f K2A + Jm2f K22A
+ Lm2f K1AK1B +Mm2f K1AK2A +Nm2f K1BK2A, f = A,B.
(3.12)
2Note that we do not have to consider the investment strategy of firm A for product 2’s
capacity, explicitly, since below, we will use the value function of m2 as a salvage value for the
game.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Value functions ofm2 forK2A = 0. Parameters: r = 0.04, δ = 0.2, η =
0.5, θ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 .
Using this functional form, the HJB-equations can be reduced to a set of alge-
braic equations which has to be satisfied by the coefficients of the quadratic value
functions. Coefficients can be found by standard numerical methods for a given
parameter setting (cf. Dawid et al. (2010a) for a similar model with slightly dif-
ferent inverse demand functions). Figure 3.1 illustrates the shape of the value
functions in m2. By regarding the value of the subproblem (minus adoption costs)
as the salvage value of the finite time horizon problem in mode m1, i.e.
S(K1A(T ), K1B(T )) = V m2A (K1A(T ), K1B(T ), 0)− F , (3.13)
we can write the optimization problems of both firms in m1 as
max
T,I1A
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1K1A − C1(I1A)
)
dt
+e−rT
(
V m2A
(
K1A(T ), K1B(T ), 0
)
− F
)
,
(3.14)
and
max
I1B
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
p1K1B − C1(I1B)
)
dt+ e−rTV m2B
(
K1A(T ), K1B(T ), 0
)
. (3.15)
If an infinite time horizon is optimal, then the salvage value disappears and the
value of the game is simply given by V m1f (·) for f = A,B and there is a unique
stable steady state (see Reynolds (1987) and Jun and Vives (2004)).
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As discussed above, we assume that the innovator announces the date of prod-
uct introduction and has commitment power such that he cannot deviate from the
announced date even though ex post it would be better to do so. Thus, the non-
innovator takes T as given by the preannouncement and chooses his investment
strategy in order to maximize the value of the game. Technically speaking, we em-
ploy Markov (feedback) strategies for the investment in capacities and open-loop
strategies for the introduction time T .
Note that for any fixed T , the game in m1 is still of linear quadratic structure.
Since the problem in m1 has a finite time horizon the coefficients in the value
function depend on time and from the HJB-equations a set of Riccati equations
for those coefficients is obtained. We solve this system using standard numerical
solvers. The corresponding HJB-equations to be fulfilled are given in Appendix
3.A.2. Denote the value function of the game starting in m1 and switching to m2
at a fixed T by Vf (K, t;T ), f = A,B, and the corresponding profile of Markovian
strategies in equilibrium by φf (K, t;T ), f = A,B.
Note that the solution is time-invariant since the game is time-autonomous,
i.e. t appears explicitly only in the discounting term e−rt. Hence,
Vf (K, t;T ) = Vf (K, 0;T − t), f = A,B, (3.16)
∀ K and t ≤ T (cf. Caulkins et al. (2015)). In order to endogenize the time
horizon of the game, we proceed as follows. We consider a sufficiently large fixed
time horizon and compute the optimal distance to the terminal time where the
firm wants the game to start. For this, we use a large T , which is defined below.
Standard turnpike arguments (see Grüne et al. (2015) and McKenzie (1986))
yield that for T → ∞, the change in the value function becomes small since it is
converging to the (time-independent) value function of the infinite horizon game
in mode m1, V m1f . For an  with 0 <   |V m2A (Kini, 0)− V m1A (Kini)|3 and an
initial capacity Kini, a large T satisfies
∣∣∣Vf (Kini, 0;T )− V m1f (Kini)∣∣∣ ≤ . (3.17)
3Note that for higher choices of , inequality (3.17) might be satisfied for all T and hence
would not yield a large T .
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We denote by T l(,Kini) the minimal T for which inequality (3.17) holds for all
T ≥ T l. Among all capacities which yield positive prices, we select the max-
imal T l which we denote by TL(), i.e. TL() := T l(,Kmax) where Kmax =
arg maxK(T l(,K)).
For finite T , we denote the right hand side of the HJB-equation of firm A
(equation (3.44) in Appendix 3.A.2) by4
H(K) = pm11 (·)K1A − C(φ1A(K, t;T )) + V m2A,K1A(·)(φ1A(K, t;T )− δK1A)
+ V m2A,K1B(·)(φ1B(K, t;T )− δK1B).
(3.18)
Note that the optimal strategies φ1A and φ1B stem from m1 whereas derivatives of
the value function of m2 are considered. We assume that V (K, t;T ) is sufficiently
smooth, i.e. let V (K, t;T ) be continuously differentiable in K and t for all T .
Then, the following lemma gives a sufficient condition for delaying the product
introduction.
Lemma 3.1. For a Kini, if
H(Kini) > r(V m2A − F ) (3.19)
holds, then for Kini, the optimal time of product introduction T ∗ is positive, possibly
infinite.
Proof. Consider the value for the innovator to stay for the duration of  in m1 and
afterwards to switch to m2 under the equilibrium strategy φ = (φ1A, φ1B):
VA(K(0), 0; ) =
∫ 
0
e−rsFm1A (K(s), φ(K(s), s; )ds+ e−r(V m2A (K())−F ). (3.20)
where Fm1A (·) is the instantaneous profit function of the innovator in m1. For a
finite time horizon, since we consider non-stationary strategies, altering the termi-
nal time would yield different investments in m1 and hence different values for the
terminal capacities. Thus, for the sake of clarity, here we denote the capacity at t
4Actually, H(K) is the Hamiltonian where the co-state variable is replaced by the state
derivatives of the scrap value (cf. Pontryagin’s maximum principle with finite time horizon e.g.
in Dockner et al. (2000)).
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for terminal time T by K1f (t, T ), f = A,B. K1A(, ) can then be derived via the
initial value K1A(0, ) and the investments from 0 until :
K1A(, ) = K1A(0, ) +
∫ 
0
(φ1A(K(τ, ), τ ; )− δK1A(τ, ))dτ. (3.21)
Its derivative with respect to  is then given by
∂K1A(, )
∂t
+ ∂K1A(, )
∂T
(3.22)
= φ1A(K(·), τ ; )− δK1A(·) +
∫ 
0
∂φ1A(K(τ, ), τ, )− δK1A(τ, )
∂T
dτ. (3.23)
In equation (3.20), subtracting VA(K(0), 0; 0) on both sides, dividing by  and
considering the limit → 0 yields
∂V (K, 0, 0)
∂T
= pm11 (·)K1A(·)− C(φ1A(K(·), 0, 0))
+ V m2A,K1A(·)
(
K˙1A(0, 0) +
∂K1A(0, 0)
∂T
)
+ V m2A,K1B(·)
(
K˙1B(0, 0) +
∂K1B(0, 0)
∂T
)
+ V m2A,t (·)
− r (V m2A (K1A(0, 0), K1B(0, 0))− F )
(3.24)
However,
∂K1f (0, 0)
∂T
= 0, f = A,B. (3.25)
Moreover, as we consider stationary strategies in m2, VA,t(·,m2) = 0. Then, due
to inequality (3.19),
∂VA(K, 0, 0)
∂T
> 0, (3.26)
which proves that delaying the product introduction marginally is better than
introducing immediately.
From optimal control theory, it is known that for H(Kini) > r(V m2A (Kini)−F ),
the innovator prefers not introducing the product immediately but introducing
whenever H = r(V m2A −F ) holds. Here, H = r(V m2A −F ) is satisfied on a switching
line (see Appendix 3.A.1). In an optimal control setting, the firm exerts control
such that the state arrives at the switching line and the switch occurs. But in
a game, due to the other player who influences the dynamics of its own and its
competitors capacity, this might not be possible in an equilibrium, i.e. there might
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not exist a terminal time T , where the state arrives at that line. In mathematical
terms, the existence of such a terminal time requires that
H(K(T )) = rS(K(T ) and H(K(t)) > rS(K(t) ∀ t < T, (3.27)
whereK(t) is the induced trajectory by the announcement of T . For the parameter
setting considered in section 3.4, a terminal time satisfying conditions (3.27) could
not be found.
Note that it is not possible to derive a (local) sufficient condition for immediate
introduction since marginally being worse-off does not imply necessarily that im-
mediate introduction is optimal. For some T > 0, the corresponding value might
still outweigh immediate introduction’s value.
Our main result is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let Vf (K, t;TL) be the value function of the game for a fixed
large end time TL() for f = A,B. Let t∗ be the time argument maximizing VA
for an initial pair Kini = (Kini1A , Kini1B ), i.e.
t∗(Kini) = arg max
t∈[0,TL]
VA(Kini, t;TL). (3.28)
If t∗(Kini) > 0, then
T ∗(Kini) = TL − t∗(Kini), (3.29)
is the optimal time of product introduction for K(0) = Kini and the value function
in m1 for f = A,B and for initial capacities Kini is given by
V optf (K, 0, t,m1) = Vf (K, t;T ∗(Kini)). (3.30)
Furthermore, if t∗(Kini) = 0 for all T ≥ TL() (i.e. for all TL(˜) with ˜ ≤ ),
then
T ∗(Kini) =∞, (3.31)
is the optimal time of product introduction for K(0) = Kini and the value function
is given by
V optf (K, 0, t,m1) = V m1f (K), f = A,B. (3.32)
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Proof. Due to time invariance, the current value of the initial game defined on the
time interval [0, TL] at t∗ is equal to the current value at 0 of the game defined over
[0, T ∗] where T ∗ = TL − t∗. Hence, it is sufficient to derive the optimal distance
to a fixed terminal time where the innovator wants the game to start.
If t∗(Kini) > 0, i.e. t∗(Kini) is interior in [0, TL], then for all T ≥ TL, according
to inequality (3.17), t∗(Kini) (shifted by T − TL) is still an interior maximum.
Hence, TL − t∗(Kini) is the optimal distance to the terminal time TL.
If t∗(Kini) = 0 for all T ≥ TL(), then the maximizing argument is at the
left boundary. More precisely, for reducing  and thereby increasing TL, t∗ = 0
remains optimal. Thus, VA(Kini, t, T ) is monotonously increasing in T . Hence,
T ∗ =∞ is optimal.
Note that for a finite T ∗, the choice of  is not unique. More precisely,  can be
any number from the interval (0, ¯) where ¯ is V (Kini, 0, T ∗(Kini),m1)−V m1(Kini).
Essentially, from a family of value functions of the game for different T’s, i.e.
for varying terminal times, the innovator has to select that one which maximizes
his profits for the initial capacity. So, the optimal time of product introduction
can be found via considering the value function for a fixed initial pair Kini and
a fixed sufficiently large terminal time and determining the optimal distance to
the terminal time5. In the next corollary, we provide necessary conditions for the
slope of the time derivative of the value function at the outset of the game.
Corollary 3.1. i) If immediate product introduction, i.e. a corner solution
T ∗ = 0 is optimal, then
lim
T→0
(
lim
t→T−
VA,t(Kini, t;T )
)
≥ 0, (3.33)
and
H ≤ rS. (3.34)
5The idea of considering large values for the terminal time has been employed by several
works, e.g. in Grass (2012).
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ii) If no product introduction, i.e. T ∗ =∞ is optimal, then
lim
T→∞
Vt(Kini, 0;T ) ≤ 0, (3.35)
iii) For an interior solution, i.e. 0 < T ∗ <∞ to be optimal we must have
Vt(Kini, 0;T ∗) = 0. (3.36)
Proof. i) For a corner solution T ∗ = 0, the maximizing argument of (3.10) is
on the right boundary, i.e. t∗ = TL. Thus,
lim
T→0
(
lim
t→T−
VA,t(Kini, t;T )
)
≥ 0,
for T ∗ = 0. The HJB-equation for T ∗ = 0 yields
rS − Vt = H. (3.37)
As the limit of Vt stays positive,
rS ≥ H. (3.38)
ii) For a corner solution T ∗ =∞, the maximizing argument is on the left bound-
ary, i.e. t∗ = 0 which corresponds to T ∗ = TL 6. Thus, limT→∞ Vt(Kini, 0;T ) ≤
0 for T ∗ =∞.
iii) For an interior solution 0 < T ∗ <∞, the first-order condition for a maximum
is given by
Vt(Kini, 0;T ∗) = 0. (3.39)
Note that Corollary 3.1 yields necessary conditions only. In particular, condi-
tion (3.39) might be satisfied for local maximums which are not globally maximal.
In the derivation of the HJB-equation (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)), when
time proceeds from t to t+ ∆, the value of the game is altered due to the change
in the state variable and due to the change of the time which affects investment
6Note that TL is selected such that it can reproduce the infinite solution.
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patterns7. The effect on the state, i.e. the transition from K(t) to K(t + ∆) is
evaluated via VK and K˙ while the pure effect of time is taken into account via
the derivative with respect to the second argument of the value function, i.e. Vt.
Consider the difference of the value of the game for a fixed state variable vector
when time moves from t to t+ ∆, ∆ > 0:
V (Kini, t+ ∆;TL)− V (Kini, t;TL). (3.40)
As we are free to choose between t + ∆ and t, (3.40) measures the change in the
value function in current-value terms. If (3.40) is positive, it is (locally) optimal
for the firm to choose a later starting point than t, and an earlier starting point,
else. As Kini is not affected by the choice of T ∗, maximizing with respect to the
second argument of the value function yields for fixed TL the (globally) optimal
time of product introduction of the free end time game.
3.4 Dynamics
In this section, we first examine the behavior of the firms for an exogenously given
product introduction time T . We then explore optimal timing and its dependence
on adoption costs and initial capacities. In case of delay, we analyze how capacities
evolve before introduction.
3.4.1 Exogenous Time Horizon
In order to depict optimal time and investment paths, we use the following fixed
parameter setting (similar to the parameter setting of Dawid et al. (2010a)):
r = 0.04, δ = 0.2, η = 0.5, θ = 0.1, γA = γB = 0.1 (3.41)
We start by analyzing the equilibrium investment strategies φf (K, t;T ), f =
A,B, for a large fixed time horizon TL = 3, and fixed initial capacity Kini =
7Note that investment strategies in m1 are non-stationary.
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(0.35, 0.35), which is depicted in Figure 3.2 8. The dashed line corresponds to the
infinite horizon case in m1. Obviously, TL is large enough to resemble the infinite
horizon investment strategy at t = 0. In panel (a), we see that the innovator
T
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t
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
I1A
I1Ainf
(a)
T
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t
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
I1B
I1Binf
(b)
Figure 3.2: Optimal Investments of both firms at a fixed pair of capacity Kini =
(0.35, 0.35) for F = 1.
reduces his investments as time approaches TL which is due to the decreased
marginal value of the established capacity when the innovator introduces the new
product. For the non-innovator, we have an interesting investment strategy which
is non-monotone in t. Note that the marginal value of its capacity is decreased in
m2 as well. Hence, eventually investments decline. The initial increase is due to the
innovator’s decreasing willingness to invest. Moreover, there is an intertemporal
strategic effect, i.e. by increasing investment, via a higher capacity and lower price
in the future, a firm can even further reduce the future investment of its competitor.
As the innovator is affected on both markets by the established capacity while the
non-innovator is affected only at the established market (since it is not producing
product 2), the non-innovator has more influence on its competitor than the other
way around.
Figure 3.2 is also suitable to assess the changes in investment incentives if
there is an unexpected product innovation and immediate preannouncement by
the innovator, given that capacities are at (0.35, 0.35). For the innovator, this
yields a downward jump of its investment in established capacities. For the non-
innovator, it depends on the length of T . For T / 0.15, there is a downward jump
8Note that in Figure 3.2, the investment strategy for a fixed capacity pair is depicted. Hence,
it is not an investment trajectory.
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whereas for higher T , there is an upward jump.
3.4.2 Endogenous Time Horizon
As described in Proposition 3.1, for each Kini, we are able to derive the optimal T
to be preannounced by the innovator. Note that due to time invariance, instead
of calculating value functions for different terminal times, it suffices to calculate
the value functions for a single TL and then to determine the optimal distance to
the terminal time (see section 3.6). An example is depicted in Figure 3.3.
t*97.5 98.0 98.5 99.0 99.5 100.0
t
2.4030
2.4035
2.4040
2.4045
VAm2
VAm1
VA
Figure 3.3: Value function for the innovator for F = 2.94, Kini = (0.35, 0.35) and
for TL = 100.
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(a) F = 2.94 .
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(b) F = 2.945 .
Figure 3.4: Value function for K1B = Km1,ss1B ≈ 0.3697.
Hence, we can obtain the value for each pair of initial states. For a fixed K1B,
more precisely for the steady state value of K1B for the infinite horizon game in
m1 which we denote by Km1,ss1B , the value for the innovator for different initial
states K1A at t = 0 is depicted in Figure 3.4(a) where for low initial Kini1A , the
Chapter 3. A Strategic Dynamic Analysis 53
innovator introduces immediately whereas for higher initial capacity, there is a
gain by delaying the product introduction9.
For higher values of F , not introducing becomes optimal for high capacities and
hence infinite solutions for T occur. There arises an indifference point10, where
introducing after some delay and not introducing at all yield the same value for the
innovator. Moreover, in general, the value function has a kink at that point since
strategies depend on the derivative of the value function w.r.t. its own capacity and
strategies in the two equilibria are very different. Note that at the point where the
innovator is indifferent between introducing immediately and delaying marginally
(around 0.3 in Figure 3.4(a)) , the value function is smooth unless F becomes too
high such that either the firm introduces immediately or never (see Figure 3.4(b))
and cf. Chapter 2 for a rigorous treatment of these issues via bifurcation diagrams
in a monopoly).
For the non-innovator, in general, the value function is not smooth at that point
where the innovator is indifferent between marginally delaying and introducing.
The reason is that generically, if the non-innovator were the one who could decide
on when to switch tom2, then he might want to introduce earlier or later compared
to the innovator’s decision. Hence, for T > 0, at t = 0, the derivative of the
value function for the non-innovator left and right to the switching line might be
different. However, due to the transversality condition requiring value matching
at t = T , the investment path is smooth even though it depends on the derivative
of the value function. Hence, there will be no jump in the investment of the non-
innovator when the innovator introduces the new product. Intuitively, in a setting
with fixed switching time T firm B anticipates the marginal effect of investment
on profits in m2 even before T and therefore investment incentives do not change
at t = T .
9The value functions of immediate and no switching intersect at a point where the slopes
of the value functions are very different and hence there is a kink. We see that the option of
delaying ’smoothes’ the value functions.
10In the literature, indifference points are called Skiba points.
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3.4.3 Optimal Timing and Investment
Here we consider the effect of adoption costs on the timing choice of the innovator.
The optimal timing for the same fixed pair Kini = (Kini1A , Kini1B ) = (0.35, 0.35) is
given in Figure 3.5 where we see that for low adoption costs the firm wants to
introduce the new product immediately. Above some threshold F¯(Kini1A ,Kini1B ), the
T
∞
0.1
F˜Kini
2.75 2.80 2.85 2.90 2.95 3.00
F
Figure 3.5: Optimal time to switch to m2.
firm does not want to introduce the new product immediately but after some
delay. This delay is higher the higher F is. There is another threshold F˜(Kini1A ,Kini1B )
where the innovator abstains totally from product introduction and stays with its
established product. Thus, there is a jump from some finite T to infinity at this
threshold. Note that the thresholds depend on initial capacities.
T=0
0<T<∞
T=∞
Kss,m1
0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38
K1A0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
K1B
Figure 3.6: Optimal trajectories for different initial capacities.
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A qualitative description of optimal timing for different levels of capacities of
both firms is given in Figure 3.6. Here, the steady state of m1 lies in the interior
of the T = ∞ area, but still a trajectory might leave that area in the meantime
and return eventually which is clearly a feature of the open-loop strategy for the
timing choice. Moreover, there are parameter settings where the steady state of
m1 does not lie in the corresponding area such that every trajectory starting in
the T = ∞ area would end up in another [0 < T < ∞] area where ex-post, the
firm would like to introduce the product (possibly after some delay) if there were
no commitment.
Furthermore, we are interested in how the optimal time of product introduction
is influenced by the capacities of both firms. Regarding the capacity of the non-
innovator, one might expect that if the non-innovator is stronger on the established
market, the innovator has higher incentives to introduce the new product earlier
in order to escape competition. But there is another effect as well, namely higher
capacity of the non-innovator leads not only to a lower price of the established
product but also to a lower price of the new product inm2. In order to compensate
for that, the innovator has incentives to decrease its own capacity on the established
market in m1 in order to be ’more prepared’ when switching to m2. Figure 3.6
suggests that the latter effect is stronger such that the stronger the competitor,
the later the product introduction, i.e. T is increasing in K1B. Moreover, the
duration in m1 is increasing in the innovator’s capacity as well. Note that for
the parameters considered here, the switching line is never reached. No matter
how close to that line, the innovator cannot force the state in an equilibrium with
Markov-perfect investment strategies to hit that line.
Another interesting observation is that for the innovator, for every initial ca-
pacity in the delaying region, it is optimal to reduce capacity whereas for the
non-innovator, the dynamics of its capacity depends on initial capacities, in par-
ticular on K1B. If K1B is relatively low, then its capacity increases, otherwise it
decreases as well. Note that the steady state value of the non-innovators capac-
ity in m2 is higher than in m1. Thus, it is very natural, that the non-innovator
increases its capacity already in m1.
Chapter 3. A Strategic Dynamic Analysis 56
In comparison to the monopoly case where the non-innovator does not exist
which has been analyzed in Chapter 2 we find the following interesting pattern:
The innovator introduces earlier, i.e. the delay in product innovation is shorter
but at the same time innovation occurs for a smaller range of costs of product
introduction, i.e. for some F the innovator would innovate in monopoly but not
in presence of a competitor even though the competitor is only active on the es-
tablished market. Thus, we see a connection between the Schumpeterian and
Arrowian perspective where market concentration facilitates innovation but de-
creases its speed.
3.5 Welfare Implications
T0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
T
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
p1
0<T<∞
T=0
T=∞
Figure 3.7: Price trajectories for F = 2.9413 and Kini = (0.35, 0.35).
Here, we aim at describing welfare implications qualitatively only11. As in
Section 2.5, welfare depends on the interpretation of F . Interpreting it as a trans-
fer, obviously, due to the higher quality of the new product and the monopolist’s
freedom to introduce the product, welfare increases, compared to no product in-
troduction, whenever product introduction is profitable. However, for the case of
delay, in m1 the price for the established product evolves differently and hence
affects consumer surplus as well. In Figure 3.7, price trajectories belonging to
11See Section 2.5 for a rigorous treatment.
Chapter 3. A Strategic Dynamic Analysis 57
immediate, optimal delayed and no product introduction are compared. We see
that for those parameters and initial capacities, in case of delayed product intro-
duction, the price for the established product is substantially higher compared to
immediate introduction. Thus, consumer surplus if affected negatively. However,
due to the reduced capacity of the innovator’s established product, investment in
capacities of the new product are typically slightly higher leading temporarily to
a slightly lower price of the new product, compared to the immediate introduction
case. Thus, the total effect of delay on consumer surplus depends on parameters
and initial capacities and hence might be ambiguous.
3.6 Discussion
Due to the time invariance property of the considered problem, the optimal strate-
gies in m1 depend only on the distance of the current time and the terminal time.
Hence, it is sufficient to calculate the optimal strategies for a large TL and then
to look for the optimal starting point, i.e. to go backwards in time. This facili-
tates the analysis in view of the fact that we have to compute optimal investment
strategies only once instead for all possible T .
As we assumed that the innovator’s timing choice is an open loop strategy and
hence he is committed to his decision of T , the optimal investment strategies are
subgame perfect given that T is fixed. But if the firm were allowed to make a new
choice of the time of introduction, then it might choose a different terminal time.
Technically speaking, we employ open-loop strategies for the decision of optimal
innovation time and closed-loop strategies for the decision of optimal investment in
capacities. At first sight, this might look like an apparent drawback of the solution
method since the innovator might not want to commit to its timing decision.
However, in this asymmetric setting, whenever the innovator fears to be worse off
in an equilibrium with closed-loop timing strategies, he could accomplish playing a
different equilibrium by preannouncing the time of the new product introduction,
thereby generating such strong commitment as considered in our setup.
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3.7 Conclusion
We identified different scenarios depending on the initial capacities and the value
of adoption costs. In the interesting case of delay of product introduction, the
innovator reduces capacities of the established product before the new product
is introduced whereas the dynamics of the non-innovator’s capacity depends on
initial capacities. Compared to the monopoly setting, the innovator abstains from
product introduction more often. We derived sufficient conditions for delaying the
product introduction and necessary conditions for the time derivative of the value
function which has to hold at the outset of the game. An interesting topic for
future research seems to be the investigation of the existence of a fully closed loop
equilibrium.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1
As derived in Lemma 3.1, the innovator is indifferent between waiting marginally
and introducing the new product if and only if H = rS, which reduces to
1
2γ2
(
∂V m2A
K2A
)2
= rF. (3.42)
Rearranging equation (3.42) yields the switching line
K1B =
√
2rγ2F −Hm2A −Mm2A K1A
Nm2A
. (3.43)
3.A.2
Given the terminal time T , the HJB-equations for non-stationary Markovian in-
vestment strategies are given by
rVA(K1A, K1B, t)− ∂VA(K1A, K1B, t)
∂t
= max
I1A
[
p1K1A − C1(I1A) + ∂VA
∂K1A
(I1A − δK1A)
+ ∂VA
∂K1B
(I∗1B − δK1B)
]
(3.44)
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and
rVB(K1A, K1B, t)− ∂VB(K1A, K1B, t)
∂t
= max
I1B
[
p1K1B − C1(I1B) + ∂VB
∂K1A
(I∗1A − δK1A)
+ ∂VB
∂K1B
(I1B − δK1B)
]
(3.45)
with the transversality conditions
Vf (K1A(T ), K1B(T ), T ) = V m2f (K1A(T ), K1B(T ), T ), f = A,B. (3.46)
Maximizing the right hand side of the HJB-equations yields
I1f =
1
γ
∂Vf
∂K1f
, f = A,B. (3.47)
Additionally, firm A has to select the optimal value for T maximizing its dis-
counted stream of profits. Due to the linear-quadratic structure of the game, we
impose the following form for the value function:
Vf = Cf (t)+Df (t)K1A+Ef (t)K21A+Ff (t)K1B+Gf (t)K21B+Lf (t)K1AK1B, f = A,B.
(3.48)
Due to the finite time horizon, we consider non-stationary Markovian strategies
and hence coefficients depend on time. Comparison of coefficients yields the fol-
lowing system of 12 riccati differential equations which are solved by standard
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numerical methods:
rCA(t) =
DA(t)2 + 2FA(t)FB(t) + 2γ1C ′A(t)
2γ1
rDA(t) =
γ1 +DA(t)(−γ1δ1 + 2EA(t)) + FB(t)LA(t) + FA(t)LB(t) + γ1D′A(t)
γ1
rEA(t) =
2EA(t)(−γ1δ1 + EA(t)) + LA(t)LB(t))
γ1
− 1 + E ′A(t)
rFA(t) =
2FB(t)GA(t) + FA(t)(−γ1δ1 + 2GB(t)) +DA(t)LA(t) + γ1F ′A(t))
γ1
rGA(t) =
GA(t)(−4γ1δ1 + 8GB(t)) + LA(t)2 + 2γ1G′A(t))
2γ1
rLA(t) =
2(−γ1δ1 + EA(t) +GB(t))LA(t) + 2GA(t)LB(t) + γ1(−1 + L′A(t))
γ1
rCB(t) =
2DA(t)DB(t) + FB(t)2 + 2γ1C ′B(t)
2γ1
rDB(t) =
DB(t)(−γ1δ1 + 2EA(t)) + 2DA(t)EB(t) + FB(t)LB(t) + γ1D′B(t)
γ1
rEB(t) =
(−4γ1δ1 + 8EA(t))EB(t) + LB(t)2 + 2γ1E ′B(t))
2γ1
rFB(t) =
γ1 + FB(t)(−γ1δ1 + 2GB(t)) +DB(t)LA(t) +DA(t)LB(t) + γ1F ′B(t)
γ1
rGB(t) =
2GB(t)(−γ1δ1 +GB(t)) + LA(t)LB(t))
γ1
− 1 +G′B(t)
rLB(t) =
2EB(t)LA(t) + 2(−γ1δ1 + EA(t) +GB(t))LB(t) + γ1(−1 + L′B(t))
γ1
(3.49)
with transversality conditions Cf (T ) = Cm2f , Df (T ) = Dm2f , Ef (T ) = Em2f , Ff (T ) =
Fm2f , Gf (T ) = Gm2f , Lf (T ) = Lm2f , f = A,B.
Chapter 4
Optimal Pricing of an Improving
Durable Good in the Presence of
Rational Consumers
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, consumers care a lot about improvements of products, in particular
technological products. There, the question arises how those improvements, e.g.
built-in into new versions of products, affect the market. Potential buyers might
react by postponing the purchase and waiting for the market launch of the im-
proved product. Indeed, many products are refreshed in regular time intervals.
Examples include smartphones, processors and cars. Lobel et al. (2016) find that
there is a substantial difference in sales before and after new smartphone intro-
ductions by Apple. Another example is the announcement of Airbus in 2001 to
introduce the A380 in 2006 which has been assessed to have a negative impact on
sales of the predecessor aircraft (see Kristiansen (2006)).
Consider a consumer who has some valuation about some current product but
is aware of an improved version of that product which will be introduced at a
certain level of quality and at a certain point in time in the future. If he buys now,
he starts consuming immediately. Alternatively, he could wait for the improved
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version of that product and derive some higher utility per period with the drawback
of starting consuming later. The intuition is that if the market launch is far away,
only few care about future products but as time evolves and the introduction of
the improved product approaches, some consumers might decide to postpone the
purchase and to wait for the better product. For heterogeneous consumers, we
are interested in which consumer types are going to wait for the new product and
which are going to buy the established product and whether there are consumers
who do not care at all about product innovations.
By setting a relatively high price for the current product, the firm would de-
crease its sales but this would cause more accumulation of consumers and more
sales of the new product. In the extreme case, the monopolist could set a high price
which is above the willingness-to-pay of the consumer with highest valuation such
that no consumer buys the established product in order to sell only the improved
product when it is introduced. Contrary, setting a low price for the established
product would result in less consumer accumulation and hence a decrease of sales
of the new product.
One critical issue is that the price for the new product has to be optimal
at the time of product introduction, i.e. optimal ex-post. This complicates the
analysis as the price expectation of the new product influences demand of the
established product and hence the final distribution of consumers at the time of
product introduction. Hence, we aim at finding a rational expectations equilibrium
(cf. Stokey (1981)) which in this setting reduces to finding a solution to a fixed-
point problem. If the firm had commitment power, he could announce the price
of the new product at the beginning, thereby influencing sales and hence the
distribution of the consumers at the introduction time of the new product. Here,
the classical problem of intertemporal pricing arises that the firm announces a
price which maximizes overall profits but is not optimal ex-post since there might
be an incentive to deviate from that announced price.
We identify different cases, which depend on the pricing of the established
and new product, where the evolution of demand differs substantially. For the
equilibrium pricing, we find that in most cases, the pricing is such that the price
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of the new product is not commensurate with its quality, in particular it is cheaper
in per quality units. Consumers start earlier to wait and this leads to a relatively
high accumulation of consumers which enables the firm to charge a relatively low
price for the second product which increases sales of the new product. In particular,
sales stop before the introduction time of the new product. A real-world example
of a firm introducing regularly new versions and stopping sales early is OnePlus
which has announced in March 2018 that the current version of its smartphone
(OnePlus 5T) will no more be available even though the new version (OnePlus 6)
was not introduced, yet1.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 4.1.1 we discuss related literature.
In Sect. 4.2, we introduce the model. The analysis of consumers’ and the mo-
nopolist’s behavior is given in Sect. 4.3. Firm Objectives and terminal consumer
distributions are presented in Sect. 4.4. A numerical example in provided in Sect.
4.5. Sect. 4.6 concludes.
4.1.1 Related Literature
In a durable goods setting, the Coase conjecture (Coase (1972)) states that due
to the lack of commitment of a monopolist to future prices, consumer expectation
of decreasing prices leads to delay of purchases and as price adjustments become
more frequent the monopolist profit converges to zero. This work has inspired
works in the intertemporal pricing literature by Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Gul
et al. (1986) and Besanko and Winston (1990) where the Coase conjecture has
been considered for particular settings.
In that literature, delay of purchase of a product is driven by the expectation
of declining prices. In our model, we would like to focus on the delay of purchase
caused by consumers awareness of a new improved product in the future. For
analytical tractability and in order to analyze only the effect of the product inno-
vation, we assume that the price of the current product is fixed and hence constant
over time.
1See e.g. https://www.androidcentral.com/oneplus-5t-no-longer-sale-north-america.
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Most of the durable goods literature assumed a simultaneous arrival of con-
sumers until Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1991) allowed for sequential arrival
of consumers which weakens the monopolist’s propensity to lower prices as time
passes. In the management literature, sequential consumer arrival is typically
modeled via a Poisson process (see e.g. Elmaghraby et al. (2009) and Yin et al.
(2009) and the survey by Gönsch et al. (2013)). Here, we assume a constant arrival
rate as has been done in Su (2007) in order to keep the model simple.
Following the literature on vertical differentiation (see e.g. the seminal work
by Mussa and Rosen (1978)), we assume that consumers’ taste for quality differs.
For two types of consumers, Moorthy and Png (1992) analyze differences between
simultaneous and sequential selling of different qualities. Assuming homogeneity
of consumers, Anton and Biglaiser (2013) consider optimal pricing of subsequent
products of different quality if consumers remain in the market and have the
opportunity to upgrade to a newer product. In Fudenberg and Tirole (1998),
upgrades are also considered. Additionally, secondhand markets are taken into
account in a two-period framework to analyze the impact of improving products for
heterogeneous consumers under different informational assumptions, in particular
anonymous, semianonymous and identified consumers (see Zhao and Jagpal (2006)
for a related work with entry of new consumers). Fishman and Rob (2000) consider
accumulated R&D costs for improving a product’s quality and implementation
costs of introducing new products to the market. However, they consider only a
homogeneous set of consumers.
Lobel et al. (2016) consider the optimal launch policy of a monopolist who
faces strategic consumers. At any time, the firm has the option to implement
the current technology, which is driven by a Brownian motion, to its product.
They consider a stock of consumers which do not leave the market after purchase
but can improve their utility by switching to the new product. However, the
price for consecutive versions of a product is assumed to be the same. This can
be interpreted as an announcement of prices. By relaxing this assumption and
allowing for different prices for consecutive versions of a product, we can take
into account the effect of different prices on consumer accumulation and whether
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it is consistent with consumers’ expectations. In particular, the prices has to be
selected such that given the resulting terminal distribution of consumers, the price
for the new product is optimal ex-post. Kristiansen (2006) is another paper which
considers in a three-stage model the effect of expected product innovations on
R&D and hence the timing of product introductions under competition.
Another important issue is how demand evolves over time. In diffusion models
(see e.g. the seminal work by Bass (1969)), consumer categories such as early
adopters and laggards are distinguished (see Krankel et al. (2006) for a recent
work). Here, demand varies as well, but not because of diffusion effects (we as-
sume that the product is well known directly from the scratch) but because of an
expectation of a future product.
Our paper is most related to Dhebar (1994) (see Kornish (2001) for some
related work) who has analyzed the impact of improving products on consumers
and firms optimal strategies within a two-period model. There, in the first period
consumers can buy the established product or wait for the second period in order
to buy the improved product. Banerjee and Soberman (2013) consider a similar
model with two types, i.e. high and low type consumers with different size and
derive differences between myopic and forward-looking buyers and differences when
quality is observable and not. Unfortunately, those frameworks are not able to
investigate dynamic issues such as consumers changing willingness-to pay during
the time interval where the improved product has not been introduced yet. Thus,
we employ a dynamic framework in continuous time and investigate changing
consumer behavior and optimal pricing strategies even before the new product
is introduced.
4.2 Model
We consider a monopolist who sells a durable product, denoted by 1, with quality
q1 in t = [0, T ) which is replaced by a new version, denoted by 2 with higher
quality q2 in t = T , i.e. q2 > q1. Hence, in every instant of time, there is only one
product sold, i.e. the older product is no more sold as soon as the new product
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is introduced2. For simplicity, production is costless and the problem ends at T .
Here, the time of product introduction is exogenously given by T and is common
knowledge. Resales are forbidden.
Consumers want to buy exactly one unit and are uniformly distributed in the
unit interval. Consumer’s valuation is denoted by θ, i.e. θ ∈ [0, 1]. θ = 0 is the
consumer with lowest and θ = 1 is the consumer with highest valuation. At the
outset of the problem, there are no consumers. Consumers are infinitesimally small
and arrive according to a deterministic flow of constant rate. Consumer arrival
rate is normalized to one (cf. Su 2007).
The durable good is infinitely durable and consumers who have bought leave
the market forever. Consumers who haven’t bought yet remain in the market. The
firm is free to choose the price of its products, but we assume that the price is kept
fixed over the selling period. The quality of the new product is common knowledge
and based on this and the price of the established product, consumers form a
price expectation for the new product3. Given the current price of the established
product p1 and the expected price of the improved product pe2 in t = T , consumers
in the market decide whether to buy the established or the new product.
The monopolist maximizes his discounted stream of profits by setting prices
optimally taking into account that consumers build rational expectations for the
price of the new product and can infer in an equilibrium the optimal price at T
for the new product from the distribution of consumers at T .
Either a consumer prefers buying the existing product immediately upon ar-
rival4 or prefers waiting for the new product which will be introduced at T . Either
way, consumers do not buy necessarily. They buy only if buying yields also posi-
2An implicit assumption is that the new product has been developed but not introduced, yet.
We assume that its quality is known.
3In Dhebar (1994), the quality of the new product is endogenous, determined via R&D efforts
of the firm. Hence, there consumers build an expectation for the quality as well.
4Note that as we have assumed that the price of the established product is fixed over [0, T ),
there is no gain of buying the established product later. In particular, for a positive discount
rate, there is a loss of buying product 1 later. This claim is formally proved below in Lemma
4.1.
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tive consumer surplus. If their valuation is below the price charged, they do not
buy at all even though they prefer buying the one product over the other.
How consumers behave depends on their individual valuation, i.e. its type
(speaking figuratively its location in the unit interval), the remaining time up to
the product introduction, the extent of quality improvement of the new product
and on prices, in particular the current price of the established product and the
expected future price of the new product.
4.3 Analysis
We start by analyzing the behavior of consumers and proceed then to the analysis
of the monopolist.
4.3.1 The Consumers’ Problem
Let uCV1 (θ) represent the current-value consumer utility if she purchases the estab-
lished product and uCV2 (θ) if she purchases the improved product in period T . For
a consumer θ, buying the established product with quality q1 for the fixed price
p1 yields utility
uCV1 (θ) = q1θ − p1. (4.1)
Buying the new product yields utility5
uCV2 (θ) = q2θ − pe2. (4.2)
Note that for consumers in the unit interval, p2 ≤ q2 holds necessarily since oth-
erwise, no consumer would buy at T which is not optimal, ex-post.
5We have assumed a linear correlation between the valuation of consumers and the importance
of technological improvement, i.e. the higher the valuation for the product, the higher is the
benefit of waiting. This seems to be reasonable since on the one hand a consumer who has very
low value for the product do not care much about its quality improvements. On the other hand,
if some consumer derives high utility of using a product, the new version has a higher influence
on her.
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Let us denote the present-value of utility for a consumer arriving at s and
buying at t by
u1(θ, t; s) = e−r(t−s)uCV1 (θ) (4.3)
where r > 0 is the discount rate. Analogously, waiting for the new product yields
in present-value terms
u2(θ, T, s) = e−r(T−s)uCV2 (θ). (4.4)
As the price of the established product is assumed to be constant before the
introduction of the new product, there is no gain from waiting and buying the
established product later.
Lemma 4.1. If a consumer buys the established product, then he buys immediately
(upon arrival).
Proof. As the price is constant and does not change in [s, T ), buying immediately
upon arrival at s strictly dominates every purchasing time in (s, T ).
Thus, for buying the established product, we consider u1(θ, s; s) which does
not depend on s, however. Thus, we simply write u1(θ) and we henceforth omit
the time argument in u2(θ, T ; s) and simply write u2(θ; s).
A consumer θ prefers buying the established product immediately upon arrival
in s than in T if
u1(θ) ≥ u2(θ; s) (4.5)
⇔
q1θ − p1 ≥ (q2θ − pe2)e−r(T−s) (4.6)
(self-selection constraint) and if
u1(θ) ≥ 0 (4.7)
(market-participation constraint for the established product).
Let us rearrange the self-selection constraint in order to get more insight to the
relation of prices and qualities:
e−r(T−s)pe2 − p1 ≥ θ(e−r(T−s)q2 − q1). (4.8)
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From this inequality, we can infer that a consumer prefers buying the established
product if the increase in price in present-value terms exceeds the increase in
quality, again in present-value terms6. As we will see below, it is important to
distinguish the cases where the product is improving in present-value terms and
not. Hence, we denote by case A the situation where the product is not improving,
i.e.
e−r(T−s)q2 − q1 ≤ 0, (4.9)
and by case B, where it is improving, i.e.
e−r(T−s)q2 − q1 > 0. (4.10)
By the assumption of q2 > q1, we will certainly end up in case B before T . In
particular, for relatively high T , the problem starts in case A and switches to case
B as the time evolves or for relatively low T , the problem starts immediately in
case B.
Dhebar (1994) argues that in case B, a necessary condition for consumers buy-
ing the established product is that the price is expected to be increasing as well,
in particular the expected increase in price has to overweigh the increase in qual-
ity since otherwise, waiting and buying the new product in T would be better
whenever the market-participation constraint is satisfied.
In the next lemma, we characterize the situation for consumers with relatively
low valuation for the product.
Lemma 4.2. For all consumers θ < p
e
2
q2
, the market-participation constraint for
the new product is not fulfilled, i.e. the value of the improved product is negative.
Proof. u2(θ; s) is negative for all θ < p
e
2
q2
and for all s.
Lemma 4.2 leads directly to the following conclusion.
Conclusion 4.1. For all consumers θ < p
e
T
q2 , if the market-participation constraint
for the established product is satisfied, consumers buy the established product.
6Note that the increase in quality is scaled by θ, i.e. the individual valuation.
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Proof. Due to Lemma 4.2, for those consumers the value of the improved prod-
uct and hence the right-hand side of inequality (4.6) is negative. If the market-
participation constraint holds, then the left-hand side of inequality (4.6) is positive
such that the inequality holds, i.e. buying the established product is optimal.
Thus, for all consumers θ < p
e
T
q2,e , the market participation constraint is the
binding constraint only. Hence, setting u1(θ) = 0 and rearranging yields the
willingness-to-pay (henceforth wtp) function for consumers θ < p
e
2
q2
,
wtp1(θ, t) = θq1, θ <
pe2
q2
, (4.11)
which actually does not depend on time.
According to inequality (4.6) , for all consumers θ ≥ pe2
q2
, if the self-selection
constraint is fulfilled, then the market participation constraint holds necessarily,
i.e. u1(θ) ≥ 0. Thus, we can neglect the latter constraint and consider the self-
selection constraint for purchase timing. By rearranging inequality (4.6), we can
derive the wtp of a consumer, i.e. the highest price the firm could charge from
consumer θ such that she still buys:
wtp1(θ, t) = θq1 + e−r(T−t)(pe2 − θq2), θ ≥
pe2
q2
, (4.12)
where the second term is always negative, i.e. compared to the no innovation
setting, the awareness of the introduction of a better product in the future reduces
the wtp of consumers with relatively high valuation7. Note that the wtp functions
coincide for peT/q2, i.e. the wtp function is continuous in θ and has a kink at pe2/q2.
In contrast to (4.11), for θ > pe2/q2 the wtp depends explicitly on time. Let us
rearrange (4.12) in order to gain more insight:
wtp1(θ, t) = θ(q1 − q2e−r(T−t)) + pe2e−r(T−t). (4.13)
Neglecting the option of buying the established product, the price of the new
product discounted to the present time t is given by pe2e−r(T−t). Taking this option
into account, the comparison of the established and the new product is measured
7Note that in the no innovation case, only the market-participation constraint has to be
fulfilled.
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via the first term which is positive in case A and negative in case B. In case A where
the product is not improving in present-value terms, it measures the mark-up a
consumer is willing to pay in order to consume now and avoid waiting. In Case
B where the product is expected to improve in present-value terms, it measures
the mark-down the consumer wants to save in order to consume the established
‘worse’ product now instead of waiting and consuming the better product.
For starting in case A, the switching time to case B can be easily derived and
is given by
τ := T − ln q2 − ln q1
r
, (4.14)
which is less than T as we have assumed that q2 > q1. If the problem starts in case
B, then we set τ := 0. The situation at τ for starting in case A is characterized in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.3. If τ > 0, i.e. for starting in case A, at the switching time τ , the wtp
of all consumers θ ≥ pe2
q2
is the same, namely e−r(T−τ)pe2.
Proof. According to the definition of cases A and B, at τ , q1− q2e−r(T−t) = 0 such
that the first term of the wtp function cancels out and it remains wtp1(θ, τ) =
e−r(T−τ)pe2 which is independent of θ.
Lemma 4.3 states that at τ there exists a threshold, namely p
e
T
q2,e , above which
every consumer has exactly the same wtp.
In case B, for θ ≥ peT
q2,e , the higher the valuation, the lower is the willingness
to pay for the established product since there the product is improving. It shows
that high-valuation consumers’ attention is devoted to the new improved product
whereas low-valuation consumers do not care at all about product innovation.
Note that the wtp function for θ > p
e
T
q2,e decreases in t whereas for θ ≤
peT
q2,e , the wtp
is constant.
In Figure 4.1a), we illustrate that initially the new product is not improving
in present-value terms. The wtp has a kink and follows intuition that the higher
the valuation for a product, the higher the wtp, i.e. the wtp is monotonously
increasing. In Figure 4.1b) however, the new product is improving in present-
value terms. Hence, there is a peak at θ = pe2/q2. A consumer located in the
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Figure 4.1: Willingness-to-pay functions in case A and B.
center has a higher wtp than a consumer located at the ends. For a price below
the kink, it can be directly observed that central consumers buy whereas low types
do not buy since it does not yield positive consumer surplus and high types do not
buy as well but for a different reason,they prefer to wait for the improved product.
4.3.2 The Monopolist’s Problem
Up to now, we have only characterized the demand structure. This section is
devoted to the analysis of the monopolist’s behavior. As mentioned above, we
consider a firm who wants to set prices p1 and p2 such that the discounted stream
of profits is maximized. A durable goods monopolist creates his own competition:
by selling today he decreases demand tomorrow. There are the following strategic
issues to take into account. Demand varies due to two reasons, first because of
the varying willingness to pay of the consumers and second due to the influx
of new consumers. In the language of dynamic optimal control problems, one
may interpret the prices as the control variables and the stock of consumers or
more specifically the distribution of consumers as the (infinitely dimensional) state
variable.
Let g(θ, t; p1, pe2) be the density function of consumers at time t describing the
stock of consumers and G(θ, t; p1, pe2) its cumulative distribution function. For
simplicity, the arrival rate is given by 1 and at the outset there are no consumers.
For instance, if prices are set such that consumers do not buy, then G(θ, t; p1, pe2)
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is given by tθ. Let I(θ, p1, pe2) be the time interval8 where consumer θ buys the
established product. Let pit(p1, pe2) be the profit of the firm for t < T . For t = T , we
have piT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)), which depends on the final distribution of consumers
which is generated by the expected price of the new product and on the price p2
which is indeed set by the firm at T .
We are interested in finding prices p1 and p2 where consumers’ expectations
reveal to be true and no consumer regrets his purchase decision.
Definition 4.1. Prices (p1, p2) constitute a credible price pair, if given p1, con-
sumers expect p2, i.e. p2 is maximizing the terminal profit given the terminal
distribution of consumers G(θ, T ; p1, p2).
Hence, for a credible price pair, the monopolist’s choice of price at T is con-
sistent with the consumers’ expectations and no consumer regrets his purchase or
waiting decision. Then, the objective function of the firm is given by
max
p1,p2
∫ T
0
e−rtpit(p1, pe2)dt+ e−rTpiT
(
p2, G(θ, t, p1, pe2)
)
dt (4.15)
subject to
pe2 = arg maxp2 piT (p2, G(θ, T, p1, p
e
2)) (4.16)
and
g˙(θ, t; p1, pe2) = 0 ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ t ∈ I(θ, p1, pe2),
g˙(θ, t; p1, pe2) = 1 ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ t /∈ I(θ, p1, pe2),
g(θ, 0; p1, pe2) = 0 ∀ θ ∈ [0, 1],
(4.17)
i.e. the firm maximizes among all credible price pairs which yields the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. Technically, this is a fixed-point problem whose existence
is not guaranteed per se as we will discuss below.
4.4 Firm’s Objective and Consumer Distribution
We start at the terminal time T where the new product is introduced and the
established product is taken from the market. At the terminal date, we deal with
8The wtp is monotonously decreasing with respect to t, hence I(θ, p1, pe2) is indeed a connected
set, i.e. an interval.
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a particular demand structure. Since the problem ends at this point, this is a
static optimization problem and the wtp of the consumers is no more conditional
on the next improved product but depends merely on the valuation, i.e. the type
of the consumer and the product’s current quality which has increased at T . Thus,
the wtp of a consumer with valuation θ reads
wtp2(θ) = q2θ. (4.18)
Hence, the indifferent consumer is given by p2/q2. Thus, the objective functional
at T reads
max
p2
piT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)) = maxp2
∫ 1
p2
q2
p2dg(θ, ·) = max
p2
p2
(
G(1, T ; p1, pe2)−G(
p2
q2
, T ; p1, pe2)
)
,
s.t. (4.16). For t < T , we start with characterizing the indifferent consumer who
is indifferent between buying the established product upon arrival and the new
product at T (cf. Dhebar (1994)). In case A, she is characterized by
θ1A := min
{
θ : 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, q1θ − p1 ≥ 0,
e−r(T−t)pe2 − p1 ≥ θ(e−r(T−t)q2 − q1)
}
.
(4.19)
In case B, she is given by
θ1B := max
{
θ : 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, q1θ − p1 ≥ 0,
e−r(T−t)pe2 − p1 ≥ θ(e−r(T−t)q2 − q1)
}
.
(4.20)
Hence, in case A, all θ > θ1A prefer buying the established product whereas in
case B, it is the other way around, i.e. all θ < θ1B prefer buying the established
product over the new product. From
e−r(T−t)p2 − p1 = θ(e−r(T−t)q2 − q1) (4.21)
the consumer which is indifferent between buying the established and the new
product can be derived:
θ˜(t) := θ1A = θ1B = max[0,min[1,
e−r(T−t)pe2 − p1
e−r(T−t)q2 − q1 ]].
If there were no new product, the market participation constraint would have
to be satisfied only, i.e. the consumer who is indifferent between buying and not
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buying would be given by
θ1 := min
{
θ : 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, q1θ − p1 ≥ 0
}
.
The optimal price for the new product at T depends on the distribution of
consumers who have not bought the established product before. The distribution,
however, depends on both, p1 and pe2 . There are three cases of prices (p1, pe2) which
lead to structurally different distributions. More precisely, it depends on whether
p1 is above, equal to or below the price at the kink of the wtp, i.e. whether
p1 S pe2 · q1/q2, (4.22)
which is the price at the kink point θ = pe2/q2. As discussed earlier, note that the
kink is in the unit interval since pe2 ≤ q2.
Denote the time where the willingness to pay of a consumer θ equals p1 by tˆ(θ),
if it exists (see Appendix 4.A.1 for its formula.). If not, set tˆ(θ) = 0. The three
cases are characterized by
• Case I: p1 > pe2 q
1
q2 (⇔ tˆ(1) ≤ τ): For t ≤ tˆ(1) (in case A), the set of buyers
is given by [θ1A, 1] and the indifferent consumer θ1A increases such that sales
stop eventually in case A and there are no sales anymore. If tˆ(1) =0, then
there are no sales at all before T . The objective functional is then given by
max
p1,p2
∫ tˆ(1)
0
e−rtp1(1− θ1A)dt+ e−rTpiT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)),
s.t. (4.16).
• Case II: p1 < pe2 q
1
q2 (⇔ tˆ(1) ≥ τ): For t ≤ tˆ(1), the set of buyers is given
by [θ1, 1] and for t ≥ tˆ(1), the demand is given by [θ1, θ1B]. 9 The objective
functional is then given by
max
p1,p2
∫ tˆ(1)
0
e−rtp1(1−θ1)dt+
∫ T
tˆ(1)
e−rtp1(θ1B−θ1)dt+e−rTpiT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)),
s.t. (4.16).
9Note that here, tˆ(1) might not exist for two reasons, either if wtp of θ = 1 stays above p1
until T or is below p1 from the beginning. In the latter case tˆ(1) must be set 0. In the first case,
both terms of the integral yield the same, i.e. tˆ(1) = T is possible as well. For simplicity, we
have assumed that tˆ(1) = 0, once it does not exist.
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• Case III: p1 = pe2 q
1
q2 (⇔ tˆ(1) = τ): In case A, demand is given by [θ1, 1] and
in case B, there are no sales at all10, i.e. demand vanishes abruptly when the
case switches form A to B. Thus, the objective functional is given by
max
p1,p2
∫ τ
0
e−rtp1(1− θ1)dt+ e−rTpiT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)).
s.t. (4.16).
Intuitively, in case I, the price of the established product is relatively high such
that only consumers with high valuation buy but as the introduction of the new
product gets closer, demand for the established product vanishes. In case II, the
price of the established good is relatively low such that until tˆ(1), all consumers
for which the market participation constraint is fulfilled buy. After tˆ(1), demand
decreases as the consumers at the ‘high-end’ start waiting for the new product.
Case III is the case in between where demand jumps to 0 at τ .
In an equilibrium, consumers form an expectation for p2 and the firm sets at
T the price which has been expected by consumers11. Here the problem arises
that the firm cannot commit to future prices, i.e. there is no commitment device
which guarantees that the firm is not going to set a different price. Hence, p2 has
to maximize the profit at T , ex-post. Thus, we are looking for price pairs (p1, p2)
which maximize the monopolist’s discounted stream of profits among all credible
price pairs.
We find that there are no credible price pairs in case II, i.e. there is no expec-
tation pe2 for p2 which is actually set by the firm at T .
Lemma 4.4. In case II, there is no credible price pair (p1, p2).
Proof. In case II, demand is given by [θ1, 1] for t < tˆ(1) and by [θ1, θ1B] for t ≥
tˆ(1). At T , θ1B is given by p1−p
e
2
q1−q2 . Hence, there are no consumers in the interval
[θ1, θ1B]=[p1q1 ,
p1−pe2
q1−q2 ]. Consider the indifferent consumer at T which is given by
p2/q2. Rearranging the definition of case II yields
p1
q1
<
p2
q2
. (4.23)
10Note that in that case, θ1 = θ1A.
11Note that actually observing p1 and forming an expectation for p2 is much less costly for the
consumers than deriving the rational expectations equilibrium under all credible price pairs.
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Furthermore, again from the definition of case II, we can derive
pe2
q1
q2
> p1
⇔ p2q1 > q2p1
⇔ p2(q1 − q2) > (p1 − peT )q2
12 ⇔ p2
q2
<
p1 − peT
q1 − q2 ,
i.e. p2/q2 is in that consumerless interval. Hence, this price cannot be optimal
ex-post since an optimal price has to be outside this interval.
Intuitively, this price cannot be optimal ex-post since the firm could increase
its price without loosing consumers or would prefer to decrease its price in order
to increase sales.
We show in Lemma 4.5 that if the problem starts in case A, then all candidates
for credible price pairs in case III are inferior. In other words, it is necessary that
the problem starts in case B (τ = 0) for having a credible price pair in case III.
Lemma 4.5. In case III, if τ > 0, there is no credible price pair.
Proof. At T , for a credible price pair, the price for the new product must be set
to p2 = p1 q2q1 and the corresponding indifferent consumer is given by θ˜ = p2/q2. In
case III, the final distribution is given by
G(θ, T ; p1, pe2) =

Tθ for θ ≤ pe2/q2
(T − τ)θ + τ pe2/q2 for pe2/q2 ≤ θ ≤ 1
(T − τ) + τ pe2/q2 for θ ≥ 1
(4.24)
Maximizing the terminal profit with respect to p2 and requiring ex-post optimality
yields two candidates, in particular p2 = q2/2 and
p2 =
T − τ
2T − τ q2. (4.25)
However, whenever τ > 0, there exists another p2 which yields a higher profit, i.e.
the candidate for a credible price is inferior and is not selected (details are given
in Appendix 4.A.3).
12Note that q1 − q2 < 0 holds by assumption.
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So rational expectations equilibria might be found in case I and additionally in
case III but only if the product is improving right from the beginning. However,
note that the latter scenario corresponds to a flat distribution13 at T and all other
choices of p1 which are higher and thus belong to case I yield the same outcome.
Hence, additionally, there will be infinitely many credible price pairs in case I.
Thus, for τ > 0, case III can be considered as a hairline case. The necessary
derivations for case I in order to obtain profits for a credible price pair are given
in Appendix 4.A.2.
4.5 Numerical Results
As the distribution structure changes for varying prices, the optimal prices are
calculated numerically. For the default parameter setting
q1 = 1, q2 = 1.1, T = 2, r = 0.1 (4.26)
the problem starts in case A where the product is not improving but switches to
case B where the product becomes improving at τ = 1.0469. We define a grid for
the price of the new product by P e,ini2 = [0.4, 0.56] with nodes of equal distance
0.001 14. Note that there is a natural threshold for the price of the established
product since if it becomes too expensive such that no consumer buys anymore
the established product, there will be a uniform distribution of consumers at T
such that the ex-post optimal price will be q2/2 (cf. proof of Lemma 4.5 and
Appendix 4.A.3). Hence, for credible price pairs, p2 becomes constant as soon as
p1 is too high that no sales occur anymore in mode 1 and hence the distribution
of consumers does not change anymore. For finding the credible price pairs, we
proceed as follows. For a fixed pe2 from the grid, we maximize the profit at T with
respect to p2 which yields p∗2 which depends on p1. Then, we solve for p1 such
that p∗2 = pe2 holds. For the considered parameter setting, this yields a unique p1
13In this scenario, the optimal price is given by p2 = q2/2 and the indifferent consumer is at
the center, i.e. at θ = 1/2.
14The grid does not need to be widened since the distribution of consumers and hence the
profit does not change for higher or lower prices, respectively.
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for each pe2 from the grid. After having calculated all candidates for optimal price
pairs, i.e. all credible price pairs, by simple comparison of its corresponding total
profits, we determine the optimal choice of p1 and p2 among the credible price
pairs.
For the credible price pairs, we find that initially p2 is increasing in p1 but
becomes constant once p1 is so high such that no consumer buys before T and
hence the optimal p2 does not change anymore. We find that the optimal price
in equilibrium for p2 is around 0.509. Thus, we define a new more dense grid
(nodes of lower distance 0.0001) P e,fine2 = [0.508, 0.51] and derive credible price
pairs which are depicted in Figure 4.2.
0.4815 0.4820 0.4825 0.4830 0.4835
p1
0.5080
0.5085
0.5090
0.5095
0.5100
p2
Figure 4.2: Credible price pairs.
0.4815 0.4820 0.4825 0.4830 0.4835
p1
0.455807
0.455808
0.455809
0.455810
Total Profits
Figure 4.3: Profits of credible price pairs.
Among those pairs, by comparing profits (see Figure 4.3) we find that it attains
its maximum at the price pair (p1, p2) = (0.4825, 0.5088) which corresponds to case
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I, i.e. the firm initially sells in mode 1 but as the time of innovation comes closer
demand decreases and sales stop in case A at tˆ(1), even before τ . More specifically,
initially, consumers in [0.6633, 1] buy the established product but as time passes,
demand decreases and sales stop at tˆ(1) = 0.6686. In particular, the indifferent
consumers shifts to the right. Figuratively speaking, the price of the established
product is too high and is perceived higher as time goes by such that more and
more consumers stop buying and start waiting for the new product.
The density of consumers at T is shown in Figure 4.4(a). At T , the indifferent
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
θ
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
g(θ,T)
(a) T = 2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
θ
1
2
3
4
g(θ,T)
(b) T = 4
Figure 4.4: Consumers’ density at T .
consumer is at 0.4625.
For an alternative parameter setting with T = 4, τ increases by 2 points to
τ = 3.0469 and qualitative results remain unaffected15. However, prices are much
lower compared to the shorter time horizon case, in particular the optimal price
pair is given by (0.4671, 0.4631). Here, initially, consumers in [0.5965, 1] buy and
sales stop at tˆ(1) = 2.2172. The corresponding density function is depicted in
Figure 4.4(b). Here, the indifferent consumer at T is at θ = 0.421. Compared to
the default parameter setting with T = 2, consumer surplus is higher since prices
are lower and in addition, consumers in [0.421, 0.4625) who were neither buying the
established nor the new product are now buying the new product. In a setting with
a finite time horizon, increasing the time interval where the established product is
sold increases consumers’ wtp. Neglecting new consumer arrival, a natural guess
15Figures are given in Appendix 4.A.4.
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would be that the price for the established product in equilibrium increases as
well. However, increasing the length of the problem while keeping the inflow of
consumers constant at the rate 1 leads to a higher total accumulation of consumers
which increases the firm’s propensity to lower the price for the new product. Hence,
the latter is dominating and the equilibrium prices for T = 4 are lower.
4.6 Conclusion
We have developed a simple and tractable model and have characterized optimal
price pairs by modeling demand endogenously in a durable-goods setting. The
assumption of rational consumers led to the framework of rational expectations
equilibria where consumers perfectly predict the price of the new product. Em-
ploying a continuous time framework before product introduction was crucial to
characterize consumers’ changing willingness to pay for the established product.
While consumers’ and the monopolist’s behavior could be described analytically,
rational expectations equilibria have been found numerically proceeding along a
grid. More precisely, in our examples, an optimal credible price pair has to be
selected among a continuum of credible price pairs which can not be accomplished
analytically.
Accounting for consumer’s potential lack of computing ability, considering
bounded rational consumers might be an interesting topic for future research.
4.A Appendix
4.A.1
For
p1 − θq1
p2 − θq2 > 0, (4.27)
tˆ(θ) is easily derived from
wtp1(θ, tˆ(θ)) = p1 (4.28)
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⇔
tˆ(θ) = T + 1
r
ln
(
p1 − θq1
p2 − θq2
)
. (4.29)
Note that for the existence of tˆ(θ), i.e. to have 0 ≤ tˆ(θ) ≤ T , p1−θq1
p2−θq2 is required to
be in the interval [e−rT , 1].
4.A.2
In case I, for a credible price pair (p1, p2), total profits are given by∫ tˆ(1)
0
e−rtp1(1− θ1A)dt+ e−rTpiT (p2, G(θ, T ; p1, p2)).
For θ ∈ [0, 1], the final density function is given by
g(θ, T ; p1, p2) =

T for θ ≤ θ˜(0)
T − tˆ(θ) for θ > θ˜(0).
(4.30)
G(·) is obtained by integrating g(·) with respect to θ
G(θ, T ; p1, p2) =

Tθ for θ ≤ θ˜(0)
T θ˜(0)− 1
r
∫
tˆ(θ)dθ for θ > θ˜(0).
(4.31)
where
∫
tˆ(θ)dθ = −p1
q1
ln (p1 − q1θ) + θ ln
(
p1 − q1θ
p2 − q2θ
)
+ p2
q2
ln (p2 − q2θ) , (4.32)
and the primitive of the integrand of the first integral is given by
e−r(T+t)p1(erT (p1−q1)q1−ert(p2q1−p1q2) ln(er(T−t)q1−q2))
rq21
, (4.33)
such that total profits can be calculated.
4.A.3
Note that for flat distributions, the optimal price at T is given by p2 = q2/2. For
non-flat distributions which emerge in case III whenever τ > 0, there might be at
most two candidates for the optimal price of the new product since the profit func-
tion consists of two concave functions which tied together is not quasiconcave. For
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credibility, the indifferent consumer at T has to be at the kink of the distribution
function. Assuming p2 ≥ pe2, the terminal profit is given by
piT (G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)) = p2
(
G(1, T ; p1, pe2)−G(
pe2
q2
, T ; p1, pe2)
)
= p2
(
T − τ + p
e
2
q2
τ − (T − τ)p2
q2
− p
e
2
q2
τ
)
= p2
(
(T − τ)(1− p2
q2
)
)
.
The first-order condition yields16
p2 =
q2
2 , (4.34)
whereas the profit for assuming p2 ≤ pe2 is given by
piT (G(θ, T ; p1, pe2)) = p2
(
G(1, T ; p1, pe2)−G(
pe2
q2
, T ; p1, pe2)
)
= p2
(
T − τ + p
e
2
q2
τ − T p2
q2
)
= p2
(
T (1− p2
q2
)− τ(1− p
e
2
q2
)
)
Requiring the first order condition to be met and requiring credibility leads to
p2 =
T − τ
2T − τ q2. (4.35)
In total, we have two candidates which satisfy local first order conditions and are
credible, i.e. q2/2 and q2(T − τ)/(2T − τ). However, we find that for pe2 = q2/2
there exists another candidate p2 (in the other part, i.e. in p2 < pe2), in particular
q2
2
(
1− τ2T
)
(4.36)
which yields a higher payoff whenever τ 2/4 > 0, which is equivalent to τ > 0.
Analogously, for pe2 = q2(T − τ)/(2T − τ), there is another candidate (also from
the other part, i.e. in p2 > pe2), given by p2 = q2/2 which yields a higher payoff
whenever τ 2 > 0. Hence whenever τ > 0 holds, the credible price pairs are inferior.
4.A.4
For T = 4, figures of credible price pairs and its corresponding profits are given in
Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
16Note that in the case of q2/2 < pe2, credibility is not fullfilled and hence q2/2 is no candidate
for the optimal price.
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p1
0.4620
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0.4630
0.4635
0.4640
p2
Figure 4.5: Credible price pairs for T = 4.
0.4660 0.4665 0.4670 0.4675 0.4680
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Figure 4.6: Profits of credible price pairs for T = 4.
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